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The dissertation investigates the role of religion and religious difference in the process
of assimilation between immigrants and native populations inWestern Europe. To do so,
it asks a set of interrelated research questions: how does cultural difference affect assim-
ilation? How do Muslims immigrant population culturally adapt to the secular context
of Western European nation-states? How does upward mobility impact the accultur-
ation patterns and experiences of religious stigma among the rising immigrant elite?
Three separate studies provide answers to these questions. The first study is a large,
theoretically-driven review of the last decade of immigrant incorporation scholarship in
America and Western Europe. Through a comparative lens, it identifies large empiri-
cal trends toward assimilation, but also the unique role played by religious and cultural
difference in the European context - a role not foreseen in assimilation theory. The sec-
ond study uses large-scale survey data from France to investigate assimilation between
Muslim immigrants and natives in terms of religiosity. Using a unique research design,
it uncovers the role of parental socialization and perceived discrimination in shaping a
religiosity surplus among Muslims compared to the reference population. The third ar-
ticle, a qualitative analyses of the subjective experience of upwardly mobile immigrants
in France, uses thirty-eight in-depth interviews to provide a first empirical look at the
rising immigrant elite. It shows that non-Muslim immigrants typically feel they have
achieved status and respect in the French community, while Muslim immigrants gener-
ally still feel like cultural outsiders despite high levels of socioeconomic attainment.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Dominant theoretical models of immigrant incorporation, from the early Chicago
school to the theoretical synthesis operated by Milton Gordon (1965), and to contem-
porary theories of segmented (Portes and Zhou 1993) and neo- (Alba and Nee 2003)
assimilation, never seriously considered religion and religious difference to be critical
dimensions of the assimilation process. In Gordon’s canonical theory of assimilation,
the acquisition of the host society’s symbols, codes and norms represented a necessary
first step, but the bulk of assimilation revolved around “structural assimilation" - the
interpenetration of immigrants’ and natives’ social circles. More recently, segmented
assimilation theory has emphasized skin color and ethnic resources as a structural fac-
tors shaping the opportunities and trajectories of the children of immigrants due to racial
stratification in the United States, while neoassimilation theory has focused on the role
of the law in favoring equal opportunity for success and social mobility in the post-Civil
Rights United States .
A lack of engagement with religion as a critical dimension of assimilation reflects
the particular purview of immigration scholars thinking and writing about assimilation
in America - a settler society celebrating cultural diversity, hyphenated identities and
freedom of religion, and where to believe is, by and large, to belong. Yet such defining
aspect of the American mainstream can hardly be assumed to be the same in the older
nation-states of Western Europe - a regional context where, by contrast, centuries of
intense military rivalry have resulted in a tighter integration of state, territory, culture
and the imagined community of belonging. In particular, a legacy of religious wars has
led to the progressive secularization of European nation-states, and uniformly low levels
of religious participation and identification among their native populations.
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Seen in such broad historical light, contemporary debates about multiculturalism
and the accommodation of ethnic and religious diversity, figuring so prominently in
contemporary European politics, should not be surprising. These national conversa-
tions, following the rhythm of election cycles, reveal the stronger links between cultural
homogeneity and social cohesion in Western Europe compared to settler societies like
the United States. The bulk of these tensions has progressively evolved to focus on reli-
gious difference rather than any other cultural dimension, such as language and ethnicity
(Brubaker 2015). In this process, the guest workers of yesteryear who participated in the
postwar reconstruction of Europe became, along with their children, European Muslims
- a large immigrant minority standing out in the European context not due to racial, eth-
nic, or class difference but through the religious norms and symbolic systems associated
with Islam. The recurring controversies generated by the legal qua societal accommoda-
tion of Islam across Europe (Joppke and Torpey 2013, Koopmans 2005) sheds light on
the absence of a policy blueprint for the successful incorporation of cultural difference.
This, too, is a legacy of the history, and the mode of entry of Muslim populations in Eu-
rope, one that was not planned or anticipated by European states as the First Oil Shock
in 1973, and the recession that followed, put an abrupt end to the rotating migration
flows of guest workers (Laurence 2016). Many of them, along with their families, chose
to stay in Europe out of fear that they would not be able to come back after returning to
their countries of origin, thus finding themselves permanent immigrants without having
really elected to do so.
In this dissertation, I focus on the incorporation trajectories of Muslim immigrants
and their children in Western Europe, with a particular empirical focus on the French
case. In doing so, I adopt and adapt the theoretical tools developed by American immi-
gration scholars to study cultural and religious adaptation in the European context, and
ask a set of interrelated research questions: how does cultural difference affect assimila-
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tion? How do Muslims immigrant population culturally adapt to the secular context of
Western European nation-states? How does upward mobility impact the acculturation
patterns and experiences of religious stigma among the rising immigrant elite?
Three separate studies provide answers to these questions. The first study is a large,
theoretically-driven review of the last decade of immigrant incorporation scholarship in
America and Western Europe. Through a comparative lens, it identifies large empirical
trends toward assimilation in both context. Specifically, the review shows that the chil-
dren of immigrants in contemporary Europe overwhelmingly experiences trajectories of
assimilation - that is, slow progress in educational and socioeconomic attainment net
of the modest social origins of their parents. This absence of a strong ethnic penalty
on life chances, however, belies the increasingly salient influence of religious affiliation
and religious difference on economic, relational and cultural outcomes of immigrant in-
corporation. We identify a circular, segregating dynamic in which religion and religious
affiliation are heavily transmitted by first-generation parents, on one hand, and uniquely
stigmatized and constructed as culturally alien by European natives. This scenario, in
which initial class inequality and religious difference interact to endogenously repro-
duce and reinforce cultural difference in the context of reception, suggest a revision of
neo-assimilation theory to include a formal theoretical proposition on the co-evolution
of cultural difference and social closure.
The second study uses large-scale survey data from France to investigate assimila-
tion between Muslim immigrants and natives in terms of religiosity. In this chapter, I
formulate and implement a unique research design allowing me to put to work influential
propositions on population heterogeneity found both in segmented and neoassimilation
theories - namely, that the native mainstream is composite and cannot be reduced to a
single, homogeneous core (Alba and Nee 2003), and that immigrant incorporation tra-
3
jectories are diverse (Portes and Zhou 1993). Using large-scale survey data from the
French census bureau and the French Demographic Institute, I find that French natives
are made of four, major subgroups at the intersection of age and social class. Among
these subgroups, religiosity varies but remains very low. I then match a large sample of
self-identified Muslim respondents to the subgroup in the French reference population
they are socially closer to. While I find that Muslim themselves are a diverse social
group, I document the existence of a sizable and consistent religiosity surplus. I show
the religiosity surplus to be closely related to parental socialization, the perception of
various forms of discrimination and the maintenance of transnational ties. Through an
original, theoretically-driven research design, this chapter documents an essential so-
cial fact - the existence of a sizable cultural difference between immigrants and natives
that, in turn, helps explain other important results in the literature. Very low rates of
intermarriage and national identification, as well as the difference in societal attitudes
documented among Muslim families - typically much more conservative than natives -
documented in past work in Europe all relate, in part or in whole, to the higher levels of
religiosity found among Muslim immigrants and their children compared to the native
populations in the host society.
The third study is a qualitative analyses of the subjective experience of upwardly
mobile immigrants in France. Using thirty-eight in-depth interviews with immigrant
professionals of North and Sub-Saharan African origin, I find that individuals who per-
ceive or experience racial stigma mobilize cultural elitism - a characteristic feature of
the culture of the French upper-middle class as documented by Bourdieu (1979) and
Lamont (1992) - to deflect racism, and present it as a quintessentially un-French man-
ifestation of social backwardness. This result, which sheds light on the important role
of cultural scripts, symbols and narratives to claim belonging, do not extend to Muslim
respondents. Rather, I find that Muslims face a type of religious stigma that is more in-
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tense than racism insofar as it is socially legitimate - e.g., involving progressive concerns
for gender equality and security among natives in post-terror France. Rather than coun-
tering stigma by mobilizing cultural elitism, Muslim respondents in this study try to fit
in by managing everyday interactions to appear as “integrated" Muslims in the eyes of
French natives. In other words, I find that Muslim respondents to have considerable dif-
ficulty converting high levels of socioeconomic attainment into cultural membership in
French society - i.e., being valued, honorable members of the national community. The
particular predicament faced by Muslim respondents in this study, and the sharp contrast
presented by non-Muslim interviewees, suggests a rethinking of the links between social
mobility and belonging assumed to be non-problematic in assimilation theory. It sug-
gests, in particular, attending to the independent role of cultural repertoires in enabling
and disabling claims to belonging among immigrants, and thus considering institution-
alized legal equality as a necessary but insufficient condition for assimilation and the
full inclusion of immigrant newcomers and their children.
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CHAPTER 2
ASSIMILATION AND THE SECOND GENERATION IN EUROPE AND
AMERICA: BLENDING AND SEGREGATING SOCIAL DYNAMICS
BETWEEN IMMIGRANTS AND NATIVES
Introduction
Over the last decades, international migration has led to unprecedented ethnic, racial
and religious diversity within Western liberal societies1. Comparative figures from na-
tional census bureaus and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) suggest that, as of the early 2010s, the proportion of foreign-born hov-
ers between 10% - France, Spain - and 20%, as in Belgium (Alba and Foner 2015,
OECD/European Union 2015) (Alba and Foner 2015, OECD/European Union 2015).
Including native-born children with at least one immigrant parent, immigrant groups
constitute 16% of the population in Spain, 19% in the UK, 20% in the Netherlands,
20% in Germany, 21% in Norway, 24% in the United States, 26% in France, 28% in
Sweden, and 30% in Belgium (OECD/European Union 2015, 17). Whether or not these
new immigrants and their children are achieving full membership in their country of
settlement, however, remains an open empirical question. Is there or isn’t there a trend
of increasing social similarity over time and generations leading to the erosion of social
boundaries distinguishing immigrants from natives? In this article, we review recent
empirical work on immigrant incorporation on both sides of the Atlantic-specifically the
United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway,
Spain and Belgium. Our aim is to synthesize research findings published within the last
decade detailing blending and segregating processes in the incorporation of immigrants
1This chapter was co-authored with Victor Nee.
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and the second generation across these national contexts.
The United States’ origin as an immigrant nation is reflected in its Constitution,
empowering Congress “to establish an uniform rule of naturalization” for citizenship.
In Western Europe by contrast, conceptions of the national community have historically
been more cultural in character, and their populations more homogenous. But there too,
large-scale immigration has led to accommodative efforts to extend citizenship rights
to immigrants and their children. Our review of the literature shows that the overall
observed pattern in both the United States and Western Europe is one of assimilation:
a process of social convergence leading to a gradual erosion of ethnic, racial, religious
and other differences as determinants of life chances for immigrants and their children
(Alba and Nee 2003).
Comparing and contrasting immigrant trajectories in Western Europe and North
America, however, we find the assimilation process to be contingent upon path-
dependent and culturally specific factors. Regarding the United States, numerous studies
point to legal status as a key causal factor channeling immigrants and their children in
specific incorporation pathways. For Western Europe, by contrast, a new literature has
emerged identifying religion-and specifically the Muslim/non-Muslim distinction-as a
potent symbolic divide affecting assimilation.
Assimilation is a complex and multidimensional convergence process occurring at
socioeconomic (resource distributions and socioeconomic attainment), relational (pref-
erence in marriage and friendship, extent of intergroup contact and trust) and cultural
(subjective feeling of belonging, being considered “one of us” by the majority group,
engaging in cultural practices identified with immigrant community at little or no social
costs at all) levels. These dimensions are, of course, causally linked. Regardless of
such interrelation, each dimension can be examined separately as a distinct signal of the
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incorporation process, involving a varying degree of blending or segregating dynamics.
Our definition of assimilation considers the agency of both immigrants and na-
tives in the maintenance or the erosion of the distinctions between them. It desig-
nates a mutual process of convergence: immigrants come to resemble natives over time
and vice versa. Cumulatively, the intermixing of people and cultures contributes to a
self-reinforcing, evolutionary remaking of mainstream society with respect to the social
groups that encompass the imagined communities of the nation state (Anderson 1991).
Assimilation does not imply homogenization of immigrant identity and culture towards
a specific core as a necessary endpoint, although such homogenization may occur. We
rather conceive of assimilation as the declining significance of context-specific markers
of difference-like race, ethnicity or religion-in the lives of immigrants and their children.
We view assimilation as a possible outcome of the generic process of incorporation
and prefer this term to the more one-sided and race-related (at least in the US) concept
of integration. The extent of intergenerational change in specific empirical measures
between the first and the second generation remains a crucial yardstick to evaluate as-
similation, and the one we focus on in our review.
2.1 Diverse assimilation trajectories in America
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 has, in a fifty-year period, progressively
reshaped the American demographic landscape with new immigration flows from Asia,
Central and Latin America, and to a lesser extent Africa and the West Indies.
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2.1.1 Intergenerational progress in socioeconomic attainment
General and large-scale studies relying on survey data, such as White and Glick (2009)
and Waters and Pineau (2015), describe an overall trend of assimilation in socioeco-
nomic outcomes like educational attainment, earnings and occupations among contem-
porary immigrants in the US. Echoing findings from an earlier study (Kasinitz et al.
2008) of the second generation in New York City, Waters and Pineau (2015) and Dun-
can and Trejo (2015) find that second generation members of most immigrant groups
reach or exceed the educational attainment of third plus generation White natives. Fe-
liciano and Lanuza (2017) show that the “second generation advantage” of children of
immigrants typically reflects the class background of their parents, who transmit aspira-
tions for high relative status in the country of destination based on their social position-
measured in terms of relative educational attainment-in the country of origin. The most
recent representative data from Census-sponsored surveys unambiguously confirms this
overall trend of substantial intergenerational progress in educational attainment across
all immigrant groups (Duncan and Trejo 2018, Tran 2018).
Beyond this general picture portraying the overall trend, there is of course a het-
erogeneous social reality. Hsin and Xie (2014) use nationally representative longitu-
dinal survey data to document a persistent academic advantage of Asian Americans
over Whites, which they and others (Lee and Zhou 2015) attribute to family-level hu-
man capital and norms of academic achievement prevalent among selective immigrant
groups from East and South Asia. Importantly, even the children of less well-educated
working class parents appear to benefit from spill-over effects of high academic achieve-
ment of middle-class Chinese immigrant and second generation children (Kasinitz et
al. 2008). By contrast, immigrants from Central America and Mexico tend to have
much lower educational attainment levels and appear to lack organizational resources
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enabling information sharing and strategies for getting ahead in the public school sys-
tem2. Notwithstanding this, the second generation makes notable progress, completing
on average three to four more years of education than their parents (Waters and Pineau
2015: 249-255, Bean et al. 2015 chapter 4, Duncan and Trejo 2018) and massively
enrolling in American colleges (Pew Hispanic Center 2013).
High average rates of educational attainment translate into white-collar occupa-
tions for a sizable proportion of the second generation. This is obviously the case among
the children of Asian immigrants, whose widespread progress into benchmark occupa-
tions of socioeconomic success such as engineering, science, medicine and law has been
well documented (Lee and Zhou 2015, Sakamoto et al. 2009). Importantly, it can also
be observed among the children of immigrant parents who arrived in the United States
with relatively low educational and occupational attainments. At 28% and 32.5% re-
spectively, second generation Mexicans and Central Americans-the descendants of the
most socially disadvantaged groups-are approximately three times more likely to be in
managerial and professional positions compared to their foreign-born peers (Waters and
Pineau, chapter 6). More generally, there is little evidence for Mexican or Latino stag-
nation or decline across generations. Although later generation Mexicans are typically
thought to be at a high risk of downward mobility, Luthra and Waldinger (2010) instead
report that they are actually much less likely than their parents to cluster in low-paying
and unstable jobs. Tran and Valdez (2015) report important progress in occupational
attainment from the immigrant to the second generation for all Latino groups.
This general pattern of upward social mobility is reflected in declining rates of spa-
tial segregation across generations for most immigrant groups (Iceland 2009) and also
2Nee and Hilbrow (2013) suggest that the high academic achievement of immigrant and second-
generation groups from Asia not only can be attributed to selectivity, but to lower relative numbers of
undocumented immigrants in these immigrant steams. The higher relative numbers of undocumented
Mexican and Central American immigrants is not surprising given the greater distance between East and
South Asia and the United States
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in the emergence of middle-class residential neighborhoods inhabited by high-achieving
immigrant minorities-the so-called ethnoburbs (Li 2009, Logan and Zheng 2010). This
dynamic of spatial attainment is not limited to Asian immigrants. Using data from Los
Angeles, Bean et al. (2015, chapter 6) show that the Mexican second generation’s typi-
cal neighborhoods have higher levels of education and a lower percentage of co-ethnics
and of poverty, and that this trend continues in the third generation. Recent work on
the wealth accumulation of Mexican Americans and other Latinos similarly point to a
cumulative pattern of upward mobility over the life course despite significant economic
hurdles among the first generation (Keister, Vallejo and Borelli 2015).
2.1.2 Blending dynamics induced by social mobility
Continuous large-scale migration may complicate the second generation’s attempts to
craft symbolic or optional forms of ethnic identity, as it may give rise to issues of cul-
tural authenticity within the immigrant community (Jiménez 2010). Nonetheless, so-
cially successful Mexican Americans commonly integrate middle-class and Mexican
identities, experiencing upward mobility while also maintaining ethnic solidarity with
less fortunate members of the community (Vallejo 2012). This produces a type of social
capital based on ethnic organizations and middle-class role models reminiscent of the
collective culture of achievement and mobility found in many Asian American commu-
nities (Lee and Zhou 2015). Although social mobility leads some to identify as White
(Emeka and Vallejo 2011), middle-class members of immigrant groups often maintain
hyphenated identities in which ethnic belonging and socioeconomic success are not mu-
tually exclusive (Vallejo 2012, Jiménez and Horowitz 2013). The ethnic culture of Ko-
rean and Indian professionals, in particular, portends a broader patterns of assimilation
wherein ethnic identity becomes largely unproblematic (Dhingra 2007).
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Research on intermarriage similarly points to a blurring of ethnic and racial bound-
aries. Despite replenishment of the pool of marriageable co-ethnics through contin-
ued migration (Lichter, Carmalt and Qian 2011), intermarriage rates have been rising
steadily since the 1980s (Alba and Foner 2015 chapter 9). A majority of native-born
Asian Americans now intermarry, most often with Whites-a pattern reflecting their high
socioeconomic attainment, which leads to opportunities to marry with the native ma-
jority group (Min and Kim 2010). Meanwhile, research on dating preferences among
Latinos suggests inclusive attitudes rather than strong tastes for same-race partners, de-
spite persistent exclusionary attitudes amongWhites (Feliciano, Lee and Robnett 2011).
Consequentially, there is an increasing number of children from mixed unions and indi-
viduals identifying as biracial (Alba, Beck and Sahin 2017).
2.1.3 The explanatory power of class rather than race in the post-
Civil Rights era
To a significant extent, human and cultural capital and family economic resources ex-
plain differences in socioeconomic mobility of the second generation across immigrant
groups. In the present era, class has more explanatory power than does race. Taking
such relative socioeconomic position into account, the contemporary, post-Civil Rights
American immigrant story thus appears to be, overall, one of assimilation moderated
by the selective power of formal immigration law and general dynamics of social re-
production. Most Asian immigrant groups, whose demographic composition has been
drastically shaped by 1965 Hart-Celler Act, are thus assimilating into the American
mainstream (Nee and Holbrow 2013, Lee and Zhou 2015; see Sakamoto et al. 2009
for a review), while the trajectories of Hispanic immigrants shows slow if significant
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progress (Morgan and Gelbgiser 2014, Luthra and Waldinger 2010, Tran and Valdez
2015, Bean et al. 2015, Tran 2018).
We find very little evidence in the recent literature for the pattern of “downward
assimilation” that Portes and Zhou’s (1993) segmented assimilation theory predicted
for immigrant minorities in America’s central cities. Of special importance here is the
incorporation of West Indian and African immigrants. Rather than a dominant trend
of downward assimilation towards a racialized underclass, empirical research describes
an overall pattern of schooling success among the US born children of black immigrant
families, especially compared to their native counterparts (Thomas 2009). This pattern is
driven by class selectivity among Black (especially African) migrant families, resulting
in high status aspirations and achievement norms in the United States (Imoagene 2017).
More generally, we observe heterogeneous incorporation trajectories shaped by
family economic resources and family structure (Elo et al. 2015, Thomas 2009, Kasinitz
et al. 2008, Sakamoto et al. 2009). This is not to say, of course, that race does not af-
fect the subjective experience of belonging among non-White members of the second
generation in the US, as recent studies on Latino (e.g. Frank et al. 2010, Vallejo 2012)
and Black (e.g. Clerge 2014, Imoagene 2017) show it does. Likewise, the Black/White
boundary remains important for intermarriage (Alba and Foner 2015 chapter 9). Yet,
there is no recent study systematically demonstrating that the life chances and incorpora-
tion trajectories of non-White members of the second generation are structurally shaped
by race3. Rather, within-group differences in such trajectories (see Alba, Jiménez and
3Three prominent studies published in the last ten years warrant closer discussion. In their impressive
longitudinal study of Mexican Americans in Los Angeles and San Antonio, Telles and Ortiz (2008) argue
that slow educational progress of Mexican immigrants beyond the second generation reflects a dynamic
of racialization. Yet, their own analysis shows that skin tone has no effect. More importantly, varia-
tion is their respondents’ occupational attainment reflects their endowment in human capital, while one
would expect racialization to nullify the effect of human capital on occupational attainment. The second
study, by Haller, Portes and Lynch (2011) uses survey data from Florida and California and argue that the
Mexican and Black Caribbean second generations are experiencing downward assimilation due to their
race. Yet, their analysis shows ethnic and racial penalties for educational and occupational attainments
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Marrow 2014, Elo et al. 2015) suggest that racialization and its associated socioeco-
nomic straits are neither inevitable nor uniform for non-White immigrant groups in
America.
2.2 The coming of age of the second generation in Western Europe
The contemporary de facto multiculturalism in Western Europe is, in great part, the
legacy of yesteryear’s guest worker programs launched during the economic boom of
the postwar period, particularly the 1960s. France, the United Kingdom and the Nether-
lands relied on their ties to their ex-colonies while Germany, Belgium, Sweden and Nor-
way relied on bilateral treaties for supplies of labor. A system of temporary contracts
thus brought large numbers of workers from Southern Europe, North Africa, Turkey,
Pakistan, and to a lesser extent Southeast Asia and the Caribbean to Europe. After
the 1973 oil shock crisis, this recruitment of guest workers abruptly stopped. How-
ever, many of these migrants stayed on in the destination countries, and migration flows
shifted, at once, to family reunification. Migrant workers and their families thus became
permanent migrants. Asylum seekers from Chile, Vietnam, Yugoslavia and the Middle
East also fed migration flows in the late 20th century. The historical narrative for Spain
is somewhat different: The immigrant population in Spain, while substantial, primar-
ily dates back to the early 21st century; it has been fueled by immigrants from other
European member states and from South America.
largely vanish once school level factors and educational aspirations are controlled for. Both studies pro-
vide relatively weak empirical evidence for a strong effect of ethnic or racial background on incorporation
outcomes net of class and other characteristics. Finally, Pager et al. (2009) use experimental evidence
and convincingly show that discrimination in hiring and job channeling affects Latinos as much as Blacks
in the low-wage market, but the study is not focused on immigrant groups. More evidence of this type
focusing explicitly on the incorporation of immigrants - rather than racial groups - in labor markets and
other institutional domains is needed to ascertain the effect of systematic ethnoracial discrimination on
progress towards assimilation.
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2.2.1 Intergenerational progress in socioeconomic attainment
As in the United States, review of the recent literature regarding the status of immi-
grants in Western Europe points to socioeconomic assimilation across generations as
the overall pattern. A crucial part of this story is intergenerational progress in educa-
tional attainment: recent comparative studies report that the second generation is much
more educated than their immigrant parents, who often came from countries with little
compulsory schooling (Crul et al. 2012). In spite of this noteworthy progress, however,
the children of immigrants in Europe typically lag behind their native peers in pre-
dictable ways. Turks and North Africans are surpassed by European-origin migrants,
with Asian-origin students outperforming both and sometimes natives as well (Alba and
Foner 2015, chapter 9). Does this indicate an immigrant-specific penalty representing
systematic ethnic inequality? It does not seem so, as scholars have established that the
gap in educational attainment is best accounted for as a gap in parental socioeconomic
resources-especially parents’ education-rather than an “ethnic” gap per se (Heath and
Brinbaum 2014). A large array of new studies in Germany (Luthra 2010, Song 2011),
France (Brinbaum and Kieffer 2009, Ichou 2013) Sweden (Jonsson and Rudolphi 2011),
Norway (Støren and Helland 2010), Spain (Portes et al. 2016, Schnell and Azzolini
2015), and the United Kingdom (Wilson, Burgess and Briggs 2011, Ichou 2015) report
that much of the gap stems from class rather than ethnic inequality. Some residual differ-
ences do remain for some groups, like African youths from the Sahel region and Turks in
France, possibly stemming from their low parental educational attainment within their
country of origin (Ichou 2014). Nevertheless, few studies report large differences once
social background is controlled for (but see Borgna and Contini 2014). Some studies
report an immigrant advantage compared to similar natives in terms of aspirations and
achievement (Wilson, Burgess and Briggs 2011, Jackson et al. 2012, Salikutluk 2016,
Fernàndez-Reino 2016), as well as an attenuated effect of parental social background
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(Luthra 2010, Brinbaum and Kieffer 2009, Tucci et al. 2013). There exists variation in
educational outcomes within groups: Turks, for example, do better in some educational
systems (such as in France and Sweden) than others (such as in Germany), despite their
general disadvantage (Crul et al. 2012). Immigrant children appear to benefit from com-
prehensive systems with early schooling encouraging language acquisition and with a
range of options kept open in later stages of secondary education (no early tracking),
thus allowing their higher aspirations to blossom (Alba and Foner 2015 chapter 8, Jack-
son et al. 2012, Crul et al. 2012, Tucci et al. 2013, Crul 2013, Borgna and Contini
2014).
The overall trends in the second generation’s labor market outcomes are social re-
production in existing structures of inequality and relative social mobility given prior
family socioeconomic status, which is generally low due to the social origins of many
immigrant families who first came through the guest worker programs. In France, the
descendants of immigrants are overrepresented in the working class but show rates of
upward mobility comparable to that of natives; thus occupying labor market positions,
on average, more desirable than their parents’ but less so than natives’ (Meurs et al.
2009). In Norway, using registry data, Hermansen (2016) documents an overall conver-
gence in socioeconomic status among the children of immigrants and natives. In Spain,
Aparicio (2007) documents large increases in occupational attainments-away from non-
qualified labor-among second-generation Moroccan and South American youths com-
pared to their parents. In Britain, using longitudinal household surveys, Li and Heath
(2016) find that the substantial disadvantage of the first generation in terms of occupa-
tional attainment vanishes in the second generation. Crucially, they find that the patterns
of social reproduction in occupational attainment across generations among natives are
mirrored among immigrants. Class origins, in other words, trump ethnic origins for the
life chances of the second generation. This important point is echoed in comparative
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work. Lessard-Phillips, Fibbi and Wanner (2012) show that the Turkish second gener-
ation experience relatively high social mobility in European cities, and that the bulk of
the gap in labor market outcomes with natives can be accounted for by human capital
differentials. Pichler (2011) shows that the second generation as a whole reaches high
occupational levels at roughly the same rate as the native majority in European coun-
tries, with similar or slightly better returns to education in the case of men. Other recent
work (Crul et al. 2017) has studied the emergence of a new, highly educated elite among
the children of immigrants, as would be predicted by this general dynamic of upward
mobility.
Qualifying this picture, however, several studies report gaps in employment rates
between natives and immigrants. In Norway, Hermansen (2013) finds that ethnic mi-
norities do not suffer a penalty in terms of promotion once employed, but does find an
unexplained residual in terms of access to employment. Echoing earlier work (Heath et
al. 2008), an ethnic penalty in access to employment for some immigrant groups has
been documented in other contexts (see Luthra 2013 for Turks in Germany, Tucci et al.
2013 for North Africans in France, Algan 2009 for comparative evidence of a gap in the
UK, Germany and France). This gap can be the effect of several processes, including
labor market institutions, lack of information about jobs among immigrant families, or
discrimination. We shall revisit this point later on.
2.2.2 Social networks and assimilation
In addition to socioeconomic outcomes, European scholars have been at the forefront
of the study of network structures as they relate to immigrant incorporation, producing
a dynamic new literature on immigrant social capital and relational integration with
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native populations. Representing a shift from the focus on intermarriage and residential
segregation of American scholars of incorporation, this research suggests that contacts
with natives like friendship and acquaintanceship are associated with better economic
outcomes such as higher income and chances of employment (Lancee 2010, Kanas et al.
2012), higher levels of acculturation in terms of identification with the host society and
host language use among immigrants (de Vroome et al. 2011, Schulz and Leszczensky
2015, Ali and Fokkema 2016) and increased tolerance among natives (Savelkoul et al.
2011, Janmaat 2014).
Much recent research has logically sought to understand the predictors of such
contact. Studies done in Germany, England and the Netherlands suggest that the main
predictors of contacts with the native majority among immigrants are generational sta-
tus (second, third, etc.) and educational attainment (Martinovic et al. 2009, Martinovic
2013, Platt 2014,Van Tubergen 2015, Damstra and Tillie 2015). While Turks appear to
exhibit both lower levels of contact and weaker advantages from contact with natives
(Martinovic et al. 2009, Schulz and Leszczensky 2015), a blending dynamic of increas-
ing social amalgamation across generation nevertheless appears to be at work. Research
on preference in friendship among immigrant adolescents in Sweden, Germany, England
and the Netherlands shows that while sharing a similar ethnic identity is an important
factor for some subgroups, it is trumped in magnitude by general principles of tie forma-
tion such as gender homophily and network effects like reciprocity (Smith et al. 2014a).
Meanwhile, research on generalized trust-the feeling that most people can be trusted,
which signals social cohesion-shows that second-generation immigrants are adopting
the trust patterns of native populations (Dinesen and Hooghe 2010) and that generalized
trust does not vary by ethnic group as much as it does by education and material cir-
cumstances (de Vroome et al. 2013). The general picture emerging from this new work
is thus one of increasing social processes of blending between natives and immigrants.
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The probability of such intergroup contacts does not appear to be determined by ethnic
differences as much as class differences.
2.2.3 Acculturation patterns
The final dimension of assimilation that European scholars have heavily scrutinized in
the last decade relates to culture, conceived in terms of identity, cultural practices such
as language and religion, and values. The trend here is broadly similar to the socioe-
conomic and relational aspects of incorporation. There is, on one hand, an important
shift in the feeling of belonging to the national community between first- and second-
generation individuals. In the United Kingdom, Platt (2014) finds that the overwhelming
majority express a feeling of belonging in Britain. Portes et al. (2011) obtain substan-
tively similar results when studying the second generation in Spain. In France, Maxwell
and Bleich (2014) focus on Muslim immigrants and document lower levels of identifi-
cation compared to other groups, but find that most of this difference vanishes among
those who were born in France and speak French. In terms of language more generally,
the relative absence of studies concerning the lack of fluency of the second generation
in the destination country language suggests it to be a nonexistent problem. Mean-
while, studies in retention of the home language suggest rapid rates of decay unless
parents explicitly emphasize it in the household context (see Soehl 2016a for France;
Van Tubergen and Mentjox 2014 for Germany, England, Sweden and the Netherlands).
Isolated studies on specific aspects of acculturation, such as name-giving (Gerhards and
Hans 2009) and attitudes towards homosexuality (Soehl 2016b), suggest similar strides
towards native reference points relative to the initial cultural distance between the desti-
nation and home country.
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The overall picture emerging from a comparative review of the literature in the
United States and Western Europe is one of assimilation as a path-dependent process
of social reproduction and relative upward mobility. Despite differences within and
between immigrant groups as well as variations in institutional and cultural contexts
of reception, the fate of the second generation in Western liberal societies appears to
be determined, first and foremost, by their initial stock in various forms of capital at the
family level. As proposed by Nee and Alba (2013), “If perceived opportunities are more
extensive and plentiful in the mainstream than in ethnic enclaves, the purposive action
of immigrants and their children will be aimed at optimizing returns to investment in hu-
man and cultural capital in the mainstream society, even in the face of opposition to their
assimilation by individual members of the majority and minority groups” (p.363). This
proposition builds on Merton’s (1968) theory of unintended consequences of purposive
action in its assumption that people striving for success often do not see themselves as
assimilating per se. “Yet unintended consequences of practical strategies and actions
undertaken in pursuit of the familiar goals-a good education, a good job, a nice place
to live, interesting friends and acquaintances, economic security-often result in specific
forms of assimilation” (p. 362). Reviewing the recent literature, we,see sizable inter-
generational progress toward majority group levels on most outcomes and generally do
not find the life chances of the children of immigrants to be considerably impacted by
ethnic differences or immigrant status per se.
2.3 Segregating dynamics for the second generation
Nonetheless, there remain significant barriers to assimilation. In the United States, un-
documented status is a source of multiple forms of disadvantage forMexican and Central
American immigrant families. In Europe, meanwhile, the influence of religion affects
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the assimilation trajectories of Muslim immigrants and their children. Additionally,
class inequality interacts with parental immigrant culture in maintaining or recreating
ethnic and religious identities among the second generation, thus preserving the sym-
bolic boundaries separating them from natives.
2.3.1 The challenges of undocumented status in the United States
Undocumented status-not having legal rights that benefit legal immigrants–has a dele-
terious effect on socioeconomic outcomes4 (Massey and Bartley 2006). Studies com-
paring documented and undocumented immigrants from Mexico and Central America
suggests a seven and four percent net wage penalty for undocumented men and women,
respectively, as well as lower returns to education (Hall et al. 2010, Bean et al. 2015
chapter 4); a higher probability of working physically demanding and repetitive jobs
and generally worse work conditions (Massey and Sanchez 2010, Hall and Greenman
2015); a lower likelihood of owning a home and higher probability of living in a low
quality neighborhood (Cort 2011, Greenman and Hall 2013). These empirical studies
underscore and help to explain a broader pattern of declining wages and resilient poverty
rates among Mexican migrants, over half of whom are undocumented in the US, largely
unable to return to Mexico due to border enforcement and thus at the risk of descent into
a new underclass (Massey and Gelatt 2010, Massey and Pren 2012, Massey et al. 2016,
Pew Hispanic Center 2011)5.
Undocumented status is consequential as regards other aspects of incorporation.
There is evidence linking the share of undocumented Mexican migrants to higher rates
4In general, undocumented immigrants come with the lowest level of formal education, while legal
immigrants include a high representation of college educated, especially from Asia, who change their
immigration status after completing their formal education in the United States.
5Older work, however, shows that labor market earnings of undocumented immigrants improve as
they acquire specific skills through work experience in the United States (Tienda and Singer 1995).
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of segregation from native Whites (Hall and Stringfield 2014). Menjívar and Abrego
(2012)’s ethnographic study reveals the perpetual fear of deportation among undocu-
mented Central American migrants in California and Arizona-fear that translates into
an avoidance of mainstream institutions like social services or even schools. Such qual-
itative approaches are particularly well suited to studying the cultural impact of the
absence of legal status on identity and self-understanding. Massey and Sanchez (2010),
for example, document the emergence of a panethnic Latina identity and a rejection of
American culture among undocumented immigrants enduring the struggles associated
with lacking papers and being barred from the American dream. In another ethno-
graphic study, Menjívar and Lakhani (2016) vividly describe the transformative effects
of immigration law on immigrants’ personal lives. For these individuals, this struggle
dictates work, marriage and childbearing decisions, civic engagement, and, ultimately,
their self-understanding as deserving individuals striving to become ’legal’. Meanwhile,
recent experimental evidence from Schachter (2016) convincingly shows that White na-
tives consider undocumented status to be an unacceptable trait of potential neighbors or
friends, and one structuring a symbolic divide between insiders and outsiders in their
mind. At a socioeconomic, relational and cultural levels, the absence of legal status thus
operates to channel undocumented immigrants away from assimilation.
What does this imply for young children who immigrated with their parents-the
so-called 1.5 generation-and the native-born second generation? Undocumented stu-
dents are less likely to finish high school and go to college (Hall and Greenman (2013),
and those in community colleges are more likely to drop out due to their ineligibility
for financial aid (Terriquez 2015). More generally, Gonzales (2011) describes the pro-
cess of “learning to be illegal” after high school for those who immigrated as children
with their parents and were protected from deportation while in school thanks to the
1982 Plyler v. Doe Supreme Court ruling. The lives of the high school dropouts and
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those who managed to go to college converge towards precariousness and work in the
low-wage sector due to the lack of a Social Security number. For those born in the US
to undocumented families, there is a pattern of intergenerational transmission of social
disadvantage. At age three, these infants tend to exhibit a lower cognitive development,
as their parents’ working conditions leave little time and energy to stimulate their chil-
dren and scant resources to pay for child care (Yoshikawa 2011). Survey data from Los
Angeles to show that children growing up in families with both undocumented parents
have, all else equal, a one to 1.7 year deficit in terms of years of school completed com-
pared to similar children in families with one or no undocumented parent (Bean et al.
2015, chapter 4). Crucially, children-especially females-whose parents entered without
papers and later regularized their status appear to catch up completely with those grow-
ing up in legally stable families (ibid 87). This implies a causal effect of legalization on
the second generation’s educational attainment.
2.3.2 The challenges of religion and cultural difference in Western
Europe
Within the sociology of immigration in the last ten years, a large literature on the incor-
poration of Muslim groups has rapidly emerged. This literature broadly documents the
crystallization of social differences between immigrants and natives around religion, and
the Muslim vs. non-Muslim divide in particular. A secondary, related literature sheds
light on the endogenous role of social inequality in reinforcing pre-existing symbolic
differences between immigrants and natives.
The persistence of a strong religious culture among Muslim immigrants long after
having migrated and among the second generation is remarkable given the normative
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pressure towards secularism and lower religiosity levels in the European context. In
Britain, Muslims’ religious identity is demonstrably as salient among individuals who
migrated fifty years ago as among those who were born in the UK (Bisin et al. 2008,
Lewis and Kashyap 2013). In the Netherlands, Maliepaard et al. (2012) describe a re-
ligious revival among the Muslim second generation. In France, Drouhot (2017) shows
that Muslims are, regardless of generation, substantially more religious than socially
comparable natives. Substantively similar findings have been reported in comparative
research across Europe (Fleischmann and Phalet 2012, Torrekens and Jacob 2016, de
Hoon and Tubergen 2014). A recurrent finding in this literature is that parental so-
cialization and control among Muslim families play a key role in the transmission of
religiosity (Drouhot 2017, Soehl 2016c, de Hoon and Tubergen 2014, Maliepaard and
Lubbers 2013, Fleischmann and Phalet 2012, Diehl et al. 2009).
Native populations react to the vitality of Muslims’ religious culture with increas-
ing suspicion if not hostility, as reflected in the evolution of public opinion in Britain
and France (Bleich 2009). Recently, Adida et al. (2016) use a series of audit stud-
ies and experimental games in France to precisely measure the potential bias in hiring,
association and allocation preferences of natives, and convincingly show that a unique
religious discrimination exists against Muslims, net of their regional, ethnic or racial
origins. The authors argue that part of this bias can be attributed to statistical discrim-
ination, and to the belief among natives that Muslims have gender and religious norms
that are incompatible with theirs. This study is especially important insofar as a host of
prior experimental studies6 that did not properly control for religion reported an ethnic
bias against groups (e.g., Pakistanis or Turks) that are overwhelmingly Muslim. Using
survey data, Heath and Martin (2013) similarly find that ethnic penalties on British labor
markets are largely religious in nature.
6E.g., Van der Bracht et al’s (2015) study of the housing market in Belgium, Kaas andManger’s (2012)
study of the labor market in Germany and Midtbøen’s (2014) study of the labor market in Norway.
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The recent literature on Muslim incorporation thus broadly depicts the social re-
production of religious culture in immigrant families, on one hand, and the stigmati-
zation of this culture by natives, on the other. The literature points to multiple conse-
quences from this dual dynamic of cultural polarization reinforcing attitudes of societal
hostility towards Muslims. First, there is a significant employment gap between Mus-
lims and non-Muslims, the exact origins of which are debated. Some point to the role of
discrimination in hiring (Lessard-Phillips et al. 2012, Connor and Koenig 2015) while
others emphasize the role of high religiosity in moderating labor force participation,
particularly among women (Khoudja and Fleischmann 2015, Koopmans 2016, Cheung
2014). It is likely that the employment gap is a product of both sides of the divide
between Muslims and non-Muslims.
Second, recent work on intermarriage and friendship structures suggests that reli-
gion has also become a key relational divide in Western Europe, contributing to segre-
gating dynamics. Using data from Belgium, Great Britain, and Germany, Carol (2016)
describes low rates of religious intermarriage among second-generationMuslims, whose
behavior does not significantly depart from their foreign-born counterparts. Through
an emphasis on cultural maintenance, Muslim parents exert strong influence on inter-
marriage rates (Carol 2016) as well as friendship and romantic involvement with non-
Muslim peers (Munniksma et al. 2012, Smith et al. 2014b) among their native-born
children. Meanwhile, using data on friendship patterns in German schools, Leszczen-
sky and Pink (2017) show that Christian students discriminate against Muslims as po-
tential friends. Previous studies reporting a strong influence of ethnic background on
homophily patterns in friendship among immigrant adolescents and natives (Smith et al.
2014a, Smith et al. 2016) did not properly control for religion and religiosity. In light
of Leszczensky and Pink (2017)’s study, it is likely that religious homophily explains
a large portion of ethnic homophily in friendship networks involving Muslim-origin
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youths.
In the case of Muslim immigrants in Europe, it thus appears that the causal arrow
follows a Weberian trajectory from culture and religious affiliation to relational and so-
cioeconomic outcomes. Parental influences aiming at cultural maintenance and discrim-
ination from natives are the two sides of the predicament faced by the second-generation
Muslim youths.
Besides religion as an exogenous source of cultural difference imported from the
country of origin, there is evidence for cultural decoupling from natives produced by
high levels of inequality experienced by the second generation. Wimmer and Soehl
(2014) use large-scale survey data across Europe to demonstrate that social and legal
disadvantage leads to the maintenance of parental culture (measured as values) from
the country of origin. Thus, inequality blocks acculturation-and does so with a sub-
stantial magnitude, as experiencing disadvantage has the same effect on acculturation
as having 8.5 fewer years of schooling. Ethnographic research in Belgium by Van Ker-
ckem et al. (2013) shows that low socioeconomic resources and limited opportunities
for social mobility result in stronger involvement in the local immigrant communities
among Belgian-born Turks. In turn, the preservation of parental cultural traits, such
as traditional gender norms, is enforced through gossip and social control in dense and
homogeneous networks making up the ethnoreligious community.
Other ethnographic accounts show that socioeconomic marginality encourages
cultural decoupling from parental as well as mainstream culture in response to rela-
tive deprivation. In Germany, Bucerius (2014) describes the lives of second-generation
male migrants from Turkey who are legal and symbolic foreigners due to their lack
of German citizenship. Perceiving their treatment as unfair, they reject what they per-
ceive to be mainstream German culture in favor of the drug trade, which allows them
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to attain material signs of success. A critical aspect of the social trajectories of poor,
second-generation Turkish men is the influence of early tracking in school towards vo-
cational careers with lower prospect for social mobility-an outcome largely explained by
parental background (Luthra 2010) but often thought by Bucerius’s subjects to reflect
anti-immigrant bias. Ethnographic research in France has documented analogous per-
ception of unequal treatment by public institutions like schools and the police (Marlière
2008) and analogous cultural responses to perceived exclusion in the form of petty crim-
inal enterprises regulated by autonomous and localized economies of honor (Sauvadet
2006).
Ethnographic accounts of the marginalized second generation in Germany and
France describe a sharp symbolic divide between an emergent âA˘Ÿus’-oppressed, poor,
isolated, powerless, non-White, Muslim-and âA˘Ÿthem’: the powerful, well-off, well-
connected, non-Muslim natives. In turn, the subjective experience of economic, spatial
and cultural marginalization provides fertile ground for oppositional worldviews and for
illicit, alternative economic options such as the drug trade (Sauvadet 2006, Lapeyronnie
2008, Bucerius 2014). While such high levels of social exclusion characterize only a
small minority among the second generation, these dysfunctional scenarios are widely
publicized and tend to contribute to a nativist sentiment in the host populations by de-
picting certain immigrant groups as problematic-e.g., being more prone to crime and
harboring norms and values that are incompatible with the mainstream. This is, in turn,
a social condition for further stigmatization and for more segregating dynamics of social
closure affecting the children of immigrants as a whole.
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2.4 Conclusion: Blending & Segregating Dynamics in Europe and
America
Overall, recent research on immigrant incorporation in the United States and in Western
Europe tends to support the proposition of neo-assimilation theory cited earlier:
• Proposition 1: Purposive action
If perceived opportunities are more extensive and plentiful in the mainstream than in
ethnic enclaves, the purposive action of immigrants and their children will be aimed
at optimizing returns to investment in human and cultural capital in the mainstream
society, even in the face of opposition to their assimilation by individual members of the
majority and minority groups (Nee and Alba 2013: 367).
As the recent and rapidly increasing literature on the deleterious effect of undoc-
umented legal status in the US makes clear, however, constitutional rules extending
formal equality of rights to legal citizens are a crucial and enabling scope condition.
Thus:
• Proposition 2: Formal institutions
If society’s constitutional rules and their enforcement by the state extend formal equality
of rights to all citizens and if political actors signal credible commitment to reinforcing
cultural beliefs and formal rules of equality of rights, then immigrants and their children
entitled to full citizenship are likely to choose a course of social action that increases
their likelihood of assimilation (ibid, 367).
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The institutional apparatus of modern polities such as the United States can out-
law racial discrimination and increase its social and economic costs in non-trivial ways
(Alba and Nee 2003: 54-56). In reviewing the recent literature, we do not find the
incorporation trajectories of immigrant groups to be structurally shaped by their racial
difference from the native majority in the contemporary, post-Civil Rights era. We do
find, however, a profound influence of their legal status and mode of entry into the U.S.
Both the central role of legal status, on one hand, and the relatively marginal place of
race, on the other, constitute a testimony to the influence of the law-the formal rules
of the game shaping incentives and defining legitimate social action among natives and
immigrants-in the incorporation process.
While the most emphatic sources of segregating dynamics in the United States in-
volve immigration law, in Western Europe the primary sources of segregating dynamics
involve cultural - specifically religious - differences. Put differently, hurdles to assim-
ilation involve the state and belonging in a political community, in one case; in the
other, they involve the nation and belonging in a cultural community. Our comparative
review of recent European research prompts us to consider the analytic importance of
initial cultural difference in triggering blending or segregating social dynamics between
immigrants and natives. We therefore propose:
• Proposition 3: Cultural difference
If certain cultural diacritics are integral to community cohesion among immigrants but
generally stigmatized among natives, cultural difference and social closure between im-
migrants and natives are likely to co-evolve. In such cases, assimilation occurs through
individualistic patterns of social mobility.
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When immigrants face strong legal or cultural barriers, how does assimilation oc-
cur? Reliance on ethnic collective action is a standard response to societal hostility, but
commonly works to reinforce segregating dynamics of the majority group, as Bonacich
and Model (1980) discuss in their study of the Japanese enclave economy in California
of the early 20th century. However, ethnic collective action can also be linked to blend-
ing dynamics, as in the Chinese community effort to gain entry of the second generation
in white public schools in the same period in Mississippi (Loewen 1988). Such mo-
bilization of ethnic collective action has become more common following Civil Rights
era legislation that outlawed racial discrimination and extended equal legal rights to
immigrant minorities. Neo-assimilation theory thus maintains:
• Proposition 4: Collective action
In general, when discriminatory barriers block an individualistic pattern of social mo-
bility, assimilation when it occurs, depends on ethnic collective action mobilized (Nee
and Alba 2013: 364).
Our review of the burgeoning literature on incorporation of immigrants in the
United States and Europe points to promising directions for future research. As already
mentioned, there is presently a relative scarcity of systematic studies on ethnoracial
discrimination and its effect on immigrant incorporation. Yet experimental evidence
convincingly shows that discrimination in hiring and job channeling affects Latinos as
much as Blacks in the low-wage market (Pager et al. 2009). More evidence of this type
focusing explicitly on the incorporation of immigrants-rather than racial groups-in labor
markets and other institutional domains is needed to ascertain the effect of systematic
ethnoracial discrimination on progress towards assimilation.
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What triggers blending or segregating social dynamics in intergroup relations?
Exploring this question in greater depth is key to future research. Nee and Alba (2013)
argue that a blurring of ethnic boundaries facilitates gradual assimilation by larger num-
bers of second generation immigrant minorities, contingent on periods of “non-zero-sum
mobility” of sustained economic growth. Inter-group competition for resources, on the
other hand, triggers segregating social dynamics (Olzak 1994; 2006). In addition, recent
work suggests that exogenous shocks such as terror attacks (Legewie 2013) or economic
crises (Rugh 2010, (Mooi-Reci and MuÃs´oz-Comet 2016) can significantly impact in-
corporation, by exacerbating economic strain among immigrants and triggering cultural
and social anxiety among natives. A latent nativism is manifest in populist politics in
both the United States and Europe, and the spillover effects of nativism on electoral
politics in late 19th century and early 20th century United States show that restrictive
immigration laws follow social movements channeled by populist politicians. Nativist
social movements of the early 20th century culminated in the passing of the Immigration
Act of 1924, which set quota on the number of Southern and Eastern European immi-
grants, and of Arabs and Jews, and provided funding to enforce the long-standing ban on
non-white immigration. In the United States and Europe, populist politicians once again
are mobilizing anti-immigrant sentiment to win votes in contested electoral campaigns,
ushering in a new era of restrictive policy and legal changes curtailing immigration. As
the third generation comes of age, furthering our understanding of the consequences
of nativism for assimilation and immigrant incorporation in Western liberal societies
represents a crucial task for future work.
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CHAPTER 3
CRACKS IN THE MELTING POT? RELIGIOSITY & ASSIMILATION
AMONG THE DIVERSE MUSLIM POPULATION IN FRANCE
3.1 Introduction
Longstanding policy and scholarly debates surrounding the integration of Muslim immi-
grants and their children have firmly established religion - rather than race, language, or
ethnicity - as the primary ground for difference and cultural accommodation in Western
Europe (Zolberg and Loon 1999, Brubaker 2015). An impressive array of recent studies
has documented the legal and institutional aspects of the integration of Islam (Laurence
2012, Carol and Koopmans 2013, Joppke and Torpey 2013); the various forms of preju-
dice Muslims face (Franz 2007, Safi and Simon 2013, Adida, Laitin and Valfort 2016);
and their subjective belonging as postcolonial minorities (Kapko 2007, Bleich 2009,
Maxwell and Bleich 2014, Beaman 2015b).
At the very heart of the controversies and debates generating this new body of
scholarship lies a simple and well-documented social fact: Muslim immigrants and their
children stand out in the secular European context by the intensity of their religious be-
liefs and practices (Bisin et al. 2007, Malieppard, Lubbers and Giesbert 2012, Kashyap
and Lewis 2013, Lagrange 2014). Yet despite the rise in scholarly publications on the
integration of Islam in Europe in recent years, such religious vitality - including among
the native born 2nd generation - remains to be explained. In this article, we focus on
shedding light on the factors and processes contributing to Muslims’ departure from
native levels of religiosity in France - the European country with the highest relative
share of self-identified Muslims. We use a novel approach to studying the assimilation
process, by inductively identifying different segments of the French native population
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corresponding to different baseline religiosity levels. This allows us to compare Mus-
lim immigrants to socially similar members of the native population and to account
for social heterogeneity in both groups - thus avoiding essentializing either of them as
bounded and homogeneous (Alba and Nee 2003, Brubaker 2004). We then test several
hypotheses and argue that three main factors contribute, among Muslim immigrants, to
a net religiosity differential compared to their native, non-Muslim counterparts: parental
religious socialization, the maintenance of different transnational relationships with the
country of origin, and the experience of discrimination in France. In particular, we
show that these three factors explain approximately 60% of the “surplus" of religiosity
of Muslims in France. Importantly, however, the analyses show that the explanatory
power of particular variables varies across subgroups, illustrating how different, parallel
processes are at work in producing a religiosity surplus for different segments of the
Muslim population.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. We first define assimilation as a
process of cultural embeddedness in the country of destination, and one implying secu-
larization in the European context and the French context in particular. We then discuss
recent evidence of delayed religious assimilation among Muslim immigrants and their
children. Drawing on the literature on immigration, ethnicity and race, we outline six
possible mechanisms to account for this phenomenon: material deprivation, alienation,
family socialization, transnationalism, replenished religiosity, and contextual effects at
the neighborhood level. Shifting to empirical analysis, we identify cohesive subgroups
in a representative sample of the French native population in order to systematically
match a sample of first- and second-generation Muslims living in France to a reference
category against which we compare their religiosity level. We then estimate a regres-
sion model of the distance in religiosity from the native level of reference within each
matched segment of the Muslim population. The final section of the article discusses
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the significance of the results for immigrant assimilation theory as well as the analyti-
cal and theoretical payoffs to an inductive identification of the relevant subgroups when
studying the assimilation process, without necessarily taking immigrant generation or
religious groups to be the natural units of analysis.
3.2 Assimilation: definition, theory & practice
3.2.1 Religiosity and assimilation: what to expect for 1st & 2nd gen-
eration Muslims?
Assimilation can be conveniently defined as a process of increasing social similarity be-
tween native and immigrant populations taking place over one or more generations. This
corresponds to the erosion of cultural (language, religion), relational (ties and patterns of
associations), and cognitive (identity) differences between host societies and newcomers
as they bear on the life chances of immigrants and their children, and their progressive
circumscription to “symbolic" and “optional" forms such as foods, dress, names, etc
(Gordon 1964, Gans 1979, Waters 1990, Alba and Nee 2003, Wimmer 2013).
For foreign-born newcomers - the so-called 1st generation - this process takes
place over the life course, after having migrated. In the US for example, studies of the
1st generation show that immigrants’ command of English increases while their health
decreases towards native levels (Enspenshade and Fu 1997, Antecol and Bedard 2006).
Existing studies of 1st generation migrants to Europe show a similarly strong influence
of the context of reception in shaping assimilation processes (Heath et al. 2008).
The largest stride towards assimilation with natives occurs among the 2nd gen-
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eration grown and socialized in the destination country, with variations across groups
and time periods regarding progress or stagnation in the third generation (Gans 1962,
Gordon 1964, Alba and Nee 2003, Kasinitz et al. 2008, Jiménez 2010). Assimilation
is not necessarily a smooth process, however. It can be conducive to tensions among
families, as parents often lose out in influence on their children to social forces in the
context of reception (Rumbaut 1994). Gans (1962) for example, in his classic study
of Italian-American working-class families in Boston’s West End, shows that parents
heavily compete with the “peer group" for the socialization of their children (Gans 1962
chapter 3-4). More recently, Mario Small (2002) has shown how cultural frames about
community, ethnic solidarity and the neighborhood can drastically change within a sin-
gle generation despite parents’ best efforts to sustain a sense of neighborhood pride and
involvement in Villa Victoria, a Latino/a immigrant enclave in Boston. More gener-
ally, major theoretical perspectives on the assimilation process, such as neoassimilation
(Alba and Nee 2003) and segmented assimilation (Portes and Zhou 1993), emphasize
a change between the first and the second generation as a result of socialization in the
destination country.
In the American context, where levels of religious practice and identification have
historically been high, one aspect of assimilation is the crystallization of religion as an
important aspect of identity and community. As Kasinitz et al. (2008) remark in their
study of the second generation in New York City, the US-born children of West Indian,
Chinese, Russian, Indian or South American origins are generally more religious than
their parents (Kasinitz et al. 2008, 264-272) - something to be expected in a country
where atheists have historically been seen as the true “cultural others" (Edgell, Gerteis
and Hartman 2006). In the U.S. in sum, to believe is, by and large, to belong.
In Europe, by contrast, increasing social similarity with natives has historically
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meant secularization. Research in France shows that the religious practice and identi-
fication of Christian immigrants from Poland and Armenia and Jews from Russia col-
lapsed in the 2nd generation (Noiriel 1996, chapter 4). More broadly, research on im-
migrant adaptation has shown that immigrants’s religiosity is affected by the context of
reception. Immigrants settling in religious countries become more religious themselves,
and vice versa (Van Tubergen 2007, Van Tubergen and Sindradottír 2011). In other
words, religious assimilation occurs in several possible directions as a form of social
and cultural embeddedness in the destination country. In the European context in gen-
eral and the French context in particular where secularization has been most powerful
(Bowen 2007), the expectation is unambiguous: we should observe an intergenerational
decay in religiosity as second-generation immigrants become less religious, and thus
more similar to their native counterparts.
3.2.2 Recent evidence of delayed religious assimilation in France
and beyond
The available qualitative and quantitative evidence, however, does not corroborate
the assimilation-as-secularization hypothesis outlined above. The qualitative scholar-
ship has depicted French-born Muslims’ subjective religious experience as a mix of
underclass-like cultural adaptation to poverty and social exclusion, and a rediscovery
and reinvention of their parents’ cultural heritage1 (Lepoutre 1997, Kapko 2007, Kepel
2012a, 2012b). Kepel (2012b) emphasizes religious change among the young members
of the 2nd and 3rd generation who practice an Islam based on public displays of iden-
tity - by fasting and following Islamic dietary restrictions - rather than spirituality and
regular attendance of religious service. Such change notwithstanding, existing quanti-
1Appendix A offers a brief primer on the history of Muslim migration in France and Europe.
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tative studies show that the 2nd generation’s religiosity is surprisingly strong, often as
strong as that of their parents (Brouard and Tiberj 2011, Lagrange 2014, Soehl 2016).
Brouard and Tiberj (2011) show that the intensity of religious identity and the following
of strict behavioral rules stemming from religious texts is much higher among Muslims,
regardless of nativity. Lagrange (2014) reaches similar conclusions and talks about a
maintenance of religious sentiment in the French-born 2nd generation (Lagrange 2014:
224-230; see also Soehl 2016). This picture differs considerably from the assimilation-
as-secularization process documented for earlier waves of Catholic and Jewish immi-
grants from Southern and Eastern Europe (Noiriel 1996 chapter 4).
Beyond the French case, a new scholarship on assimilation and religiosity has
firmly documented a similar phenomenon of religious vitality among Muslims in Eu-
rope. Despite modest evidence of assimilation (Maliepaard, Lubbers and Giesbert 2010,
De Hoon and van Tubergen 2014, Maliepaard and Alba 2015), Muslims immigrants
and their children’s levels of religiosity largely appear as impervious to the secularizing
influence of the context of reception, in such diverse national settings as the UK, Bel-
gium, the Netherlands, or Sweden (Bisin et al. 2007, Connor 2010, Güveli and Platt
2011, Fleischmann and Phalet 2012, Maliepaard, Lubbers and Giesbert 2012, Lewis
and Kashyap 2013, Torrekens and Jacobs 2016; see Voas and Fleischmann 2012 for a
review).
3.3 Possible mechanisms at work: 6 hypotheses
The phenomenon of delayed religious assimilation thus constitutes a historical surprise
and a sociological puzzle in need of an explanation. We now survey the immigration
literature in search of possible mechanisms at work in producing delayed religious as-
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similation. We propose a series of six testable hypotheses.
3.3.1 Material insecurity
One possibility to explain the religious resilience of Muslims in France is to view re-
ligiosity as a response to widespread material insecurity. The “insecurity hypothesis"
proposes that certain social conditions such as low income and unemployment are con-
ducive to high stress and high uncertainty, and thus foster the need for structuring narra-
tives and other cognitive outlets provided by the religious experience (Norris and Ingle-
hart 2004). Spiritual life thus compensates for material hardship. The insecurity hypoth-
esis has received empirical support in past studies (Van Tubergen 2007, Immerzeel and
Van Tubergen 2013). The economic plight of many Muslim communities in France and
their spatial relegation to the impoverished banlieues at the outskirts of the country’s
major cities is well-known, making the insecurity hypothesis credible (Lepoutre 1997,
Kepel 2012a).
H1: The experience of material insecurity promotes higher religiosity compared
to French natives.
3.3.2 Reactive religiosity
A second hypothesis considers the effect of feeling alienated as a result of perceiving or
experiencing unfair treatment, leading to an increased identification with the stereotyped
minority group to maintain self-esteem (Branscombe, Schmitt and Harvey 1999). This
hypothesis has been formulated as “reactive ethnicity" within the segmented assimila-
tion framework in sociology (Portes and Zhou 1993, Rumbaut 2008). It has recently
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been adapted to religion and reformulated to interpret the observed increase in reli-
gious identification associated with perceived or experienced hostility from the majority
outgroup (Connor 2010, Maliepaard and Alba 2015). Qualitative work on the 2nd gen-
eration in France has described the resentment of young Muslims feeling rejected by
the rest of the population (Kapko 2007, Kepel 2012a, 2012b). In addition, recent ex-
perimental evidence from Adida, Laitin and Valfort (2016) has established that there is
a distinct and substantial anti-Muslim discrimination on the French labor market. This
literature does not differentiate between perception and experience of discrimination;
we are therefore including both in the reactive religiosity hypothesis.
H2: The perception or experience of discrimination promotes higher religiosity
compared to French natives.
3.3.3 Parental socialization
Another mechanism potentially explaining religiosity in the 2nd generation is the in-
fluence of parental efforts to transmit their beliefs to their children, producing a phe-
nomenon of inter-generational faith transfer (Hunsberger and Brown 1984). The power
of parental religious socialization among Muslim families have been particularly well
established in past research (Scourfield et al. 2012, Jacob and Kalter 2013, de Hoon and
van Tubergen 2014, van de Pool and van Tubergen 2014, Soehl 2016).
H3: Parental religious socialization promotes higher religiosity compared to
French natives.
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3.3.4 Transnational ties
The maintenance of transnational ties among 2nd generation can lead to a cultural expo-
sure to the country of origin, which can manifest itself in a stronger religious commit-
ment if religion is salient there. The hybridization of migrant identities between “here"
and “there" has been well-theorized, albeit somewhat in parallel with the literature on
assimilation (Basch, Glick-Schiller and Blanc-Szanton 1994, Faist 2000). In terms of
religion, there is an elective affinity between the maintenance of transnational ties and
the universal dimension of Islamic society - the “Ummah" (Bowen 2012). As such,
transnational ties between Muslim communities in the old and new country can act as
prisms for the transmission of cultural beliefs and norms contributing to a maintenance
of the home country’s religious culture.
H4: Transnational ties to the country of origin promotes higher religiosity com-
pared to French natives.
3.3.5 Replenished religiosity
Recent insights on the importance of continuing waves of migration for the assimilation
process constitute a fifth hypothesis for the puzzle of delayed religious assimilation.
Mainly associated with the work of Tomas Jiménez (2010) on Mexican immigration in
the US, the replenishment hypothesis stipulates that a continuous wave of immigrant
complicates the adaptation process for later-generation migrants, because it increases
their interaction with foreign-born who act as ethnically “authentic" ambassadors for
the country of origin - in particular by de-legitimizing the optional or symbolic ethnic-
ity of later generation migrants (Jiménez 2010). A continuous influx of migrants from
Muslim-majority countries provides extensive opportunities for exchange between re-
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cently arrivedMuslim immigrants and more established migrants - including the French-
born 2nd generation - on the “true" practice of Islam and the most authentic way to be a
Muslim, one presumably involving a high degree of religiosity imported from the con-
text of origin and transmitted through social influence. Such a “replenished Islam" could
stall opportunities to craft a hybrid, possibly less intense religious practice borrowing el-
ements from both the context of origin and the context of reception.
H5: Continuous interaction with recent immigrants from Muslim-majority coun-
tries promotes higher religiosity compared to French natives.
3.3.6 Neighborhood disadvantage
Finally, it is also possible to think of delayed religious assimilation as a collective re-
sponse to social disorganization in religiously segregated neighborhoods. Ethnographic
work inspired by the ecological tradition of the Chicago school has described, in much
detail, the cultural adaptation of migrant and minority groups to social disadvantage
in the city (Gans 1962, Suttles 1970, Anderson 1999). Anderson (1999), for instance,
vividly depicts the localized system of meanings and moral norms governing behavior
and interactions in a poor, crime-ridden Philadelphia neighborhood which, while be-
ing at odds with “mainstream" middle-class culture, is locally rational and internally
consistent. In these studies, a specific neighborhood culture and morality produced by
dense networks of poor and spatially immobile neighbors arise to organize interactions
and community. The existing ethnographic evidence on culture and community life in
French urban ghettos - home to a large share of the country’s Muslim population - is
consistent with a scenario of diffusion and adoption of Islam as a collective adaptation
to social exclusion (Lepoutre 1997, Lapeyronnie 2008, Bronner 2010, Kepel 2012a,
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2012b).
H6: Neighborhood disadvantage promotes higher religiosity compared to French
natives.
3.4 Analytical strategy
Earlier work has often envisioned assimilation as a unilinear process of incorporation
into a culturally white middle-class core (Gordon 1964). A key theoretical insight of
newer perspectives on the assimilation process, however, is the internal diversity of both
immigrant and native groups (Portes and Zhou 1993, Alba and Nee 2003). Immigrants
groups arrive with different endowments in various forms of capital, from different con-
texts of origin. Conversely, destination countries are not homogeneous societies. They
are, rather, divided along multiple lines of differentiation such as space, age, class or
race. The “mainstream" is often diverse and complex, especially in countries with a
long immigration history such as France and the US (ibid).
Unfortunately, much, if not all existing work on the adaptation of Muslim im-
migrants and their children in Europe implicitly conceives of bounded, homogeneous
Muslim groups amidst a national, similarly bounded and homogeneous mainstream.
This constitutes a normative concern: taking for granted social categories like “natives"
or “Muslims" risks reifying groups whose boundaries are in fact highly contested or
fluctuating - making scholarly work on the topic potentially, and unwittingly participate
in the construction of essentialist, deeply political categories of practice rather than care-
fully reflected upon categories of analysis (Brubaker 2004, 2013). This is related to two
empirical concerns: simply comparing “Muslims" to “natives" risks pathologizing Mus-
lim populations by comparing them to a “grand" mean corresponding, in real terms, to a
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modal middle class. This would be a poor yardstick for assessing Muslim religious as-
similation as the literature suggests that only a small minority of Muslims have attained
middle class status in France (Institut Montaigne 2016). Additionally, such a “garbage
can" approach to studying assimilation can indulge in inaccuracy and oversimplifica-
tion: it is possible for different processes to be at work for different segments of the
Muslim population - in which case the immigrant or religious category would not be the
proper unit of analysis. These concerns call for a sharper, more data-driven analytical
approach (Garip 2012).
This paper therefore develops in two distinct analytical moments. First, we induc-
tively determine categories of reference within the French population, by finding cohe-
sive subgroups in a representative sample of natives. We then match each respondent
among a large, representative sample of Muslims living in France to a reference cate-
gory in the native French population based on social proximity. In the second part of the
analysis, we model Muslims’ distance to the mean religiosity of their native subgroup
of reference. In line with the relational nature of the assimilation process, our modeling
approach thus does not predict religiosity per se, but rather the net distance from the
expected level of religiosity as found in a comparable segment of French natives.
3.5 Data, methods & measures
3.5.1 Data
We use data from the complete module of the Trajectoires et Origines survey (Teo), a
high quality, representative survey of immigrant populations with a large native, refer-
ence sample aged between 18 and 60 in France, and carried out by the French census
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bureau in cooperation with the National Demographic Institute (INED). Its comprehen-
sive sets of covariates allows for a simulatenous testing of the hypotheses just proposed.
The TeO survey was designed to fill a historical gap in France, where the gathering
and use of ethnic and religious statistics has been illegal in the past (Simon 2008). The
data gathering process occurred in 2008-2009, and the data was released in 2011 (Beau-
chemin, Hamel, Simon 2016). The response rate for the survey was 58%, yielding a
sample of 21,137 respondents. The sample features 5,706 respondents identifying as
Muslims, 99.6% of whom are either 1st or 2nd generation immigrants. The sample also
features 4,179 coded as “natives", i.e. born in France of French-born parents, out of
which approximately 59% declare having a religion23.
3.5.2 Methods & measures
Clustering and matching procedure
In this study, we use cluster analysis on a large sample of French natives to determine
cohesive subgroups to serve as baselines to measure Muslims’ religiosity surplus. Clus-
ter analysis refers to a large family of techniques designed to find coherent groupings
and structure in observational data (Kaufman and Rousseeuw 2005). For our analytical
purpose, clustering and then modeling within each cluster represents a more appropri-
ate strategy compared to a matching approach, such as the popular propensity score
stratification approach (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1984) 4.
2We thus only use parts of the TeO survey data: only those respondents that are either Muslim immi-
grants or natives - the rest are non-Muslim, 1st and 2nd generation immigrants.
3The regression models presented below report lower “n"’s due to missing data on some covariates.
We correct for missingness with probability weights (see more below).
4This matching approach would model the probability of being Muslim and then create strata by
propensity scores in order to compare Muslims’ and natives’ religiosity within each. First, this requires an
exhaustive knowledge of the predictors of Muslim religious identification to get reliable estimates, which
would constitute a leap of faith in our case as sociological scholarship on the topic is only in its early
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Similarly, clustering is a more appropriate than simply accounting for group het-
erogeneity by dividing them in segments along dimensions that a priori matter. We
could decide to compare low income Muslim immigrants to low income natives, for
example. But we do not know if income is the right dimension to organize our com-
parisons. Additionally, it is possible for several dimensions (income, gender, age, urban
location...) to consolidate into subgroups (Blau 1977). In other words, what matters for
group heterogeneity may well be specific configurations of variables rather than specific
variables.
In this paper, we thus use the popular k-means clustering algorithm to identify ma-
jor categories in a sample of French natives to inductively determine reference groups
against which Muslims’ religiosity levels are to be measured. Compared to popular al-
ternatives such as hierarchical clustering which work best with nested structure such as
evolutionary trees, K-means clustering does not make any assumption about the struc-
ture of the data at hand and is much more efficient in terms of time and computer re-
sources when working on large datasets such as the TeO data. Following Garip’s ap-
proach (2012, 2016), we choose variables that both fundamentally structure French so-
ciety and are known to be associated with religiosity from past research: gender (Miller
and Hoffman 1995), age (Argue, Johnson and White 1999), education (Albrecht and
Heaton 1995), family income (Immerzeel and van Tubergen 2013), whether or not the
respondent lives in an urban setting (Finke and Stark 1988), and professional status
(working a job or not)(Chadwick and Garrett 1995, Immerzeel and van Tubergen 2013).
We transform continuous variables in dummies (coded as 0 for values below the median
and 1 for values above) to avoid an arbitrary weighting of attributes due to different
stage. Second, the unidimensional nature of the obtained propensity scores makes it hard to test different
hypotheses as the predictors associated with them are all used to compute the logit model from which the
propensity scores are obtained. More generally, while propensity score matching can potentially be an
efficient way to achieve a sharper comparison between immigrants and natives, it will remain silent on the
internal heterogeneity of both groups, which is a crucial theoretical point in immigration theory (Portes
and Zhou 1993, Alba and Nee 2003) and one which we seek to empirically engage here.
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scales, which would affect the clustering results in undesirable ways. K-means cluster-
ing uses distance (in this particular case, Euclidean distance) to compute measures of
similarity and creates cluster of minimally dissimilar observations. It aims at obtaining
as sharply differentiated clusters as possible among numerous possible solutions, differ-
ing on the number of possible clusters. We test the different clustering results with 10
diagnostic tests from the NbClust and the clValid packages in the R software to deter-
mine the most appropriate number of clusters (Brock et al. 2008, Charrad et al. 2014).
We then implement the clustering algorithm and carry out the rest of the analyses in the
Stata statistical package.
The second step is to match each 1st and 2nd generation Muslim immigrant in
the TeO survey to the cluster in the native sample he or she is most similar to on the
variables used in the original clustering, based on the smallest Euclidean distance.
Dependent variable: Distance in religiosity from the subgroup of reference in the
native population
After eachMuslim respondent has been assigned to a native subgroup of reference based
on social proximity, we can calculate his or her distance to the a reference level on four
dimensions of religiosity: the subjective importance of religion in the respondent’s life
(not, somewhat, quite or very important), the frequency at which the respondent follows
his or her religion’s dietary constraints and guidelines (never because there is none,
never, sometimes, and always), the frequency of religious service attendance (never,
only for important family events or holidays, once or twice a month, or at least once a
week) and whether or not the respondent wears a visible religious sign (never, some-
times, or always). We coded those responses following an incremental scheme and
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added them together to obtain a general religiosity score ranging from 0 to 125.
The outcome variable of interest in this study is thus the distance between the
value given by the self-identified Muslim respondents and the mean value for the subset
of French natives in their respective subgroup of reference - i.e. the subgroup within
the native population he or she is most comparable to6. We then model the distance in
religiosity to the mean religiosity of reference using ordinary least square regression,
within each cluster.
Predictors of interest
H1: Material insecurity: We measure material insecurity with four independent vari-
ables: family income standardized by the number of consumption units (1 for the the
first adult, 0.5 for each additional adult and 0.3 for each other person younger than 14),
the number of persons per room in the household, the subjective evaluation of standard
of living by the respondent’s him or herself, and the subjective evaluation of the degree
of hardship when growing up.
H2: Discrimination: We measure the perception of discrimination through a ques-
tion on the opinion about the frequency of discrimination in France yielding a variable
on the perception of discrimination (low, medium and high). Second, we exploit the
rich module of discrimination in the TeO survey to construct variables regarding the
5The subjective importance of religion and religious attendance both runs from 0 to 3 while wearing
a religious sign and following dietary restrictions run from 0 to 3 with “Never" being coded as 0 and
“sometimes" being coded as “2" in order to give the same weights to similarly worded responses across
items
6Only respondents who declared having a religion answered questions on religious practices on which
our religiosity measure is based. In this paper, we include French native who do not have a religion
(around 42% of the native sample) as “0" scores. we re-ran the analyses presented below including only
French natives declaring to have a religion and obtained substantively similar results. We choose to
include areligious respondents since they represent a large fraction of the population and ignoring them
would make for a less meaningful comparison.
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lived experience of discrimination. Each respondent declaring having been discrimi-
nated against had to identify specific ground on which he or she thought he or she had
been treated unfairly. We coded these as a series a dummy variable reporting discrimi-
nation based on one’s religion, one’s name, one’s accent, one’s race, or one’s physical
appearance, as well as in specific situations on the housing market, by mainstream pub-
lic institutions (such as by the police, in a public administration or at the post office),
and at work.
H3: Parental religious socialization: To measure the influence of parental social-
ization on current religious identity and practices, we use the respondent’s answer to a
question about the importance of religion in the education received from parents (“not
at all" “somewhat" “quite" or “very" important).
H4: Transnational ties: We include three different types of transnational ties with
the country of origin, all coded as dummies: whether or not the respondent maintains
friendship or family ties, whether or not the respondent sends remittances, and whether
or not he owns property in the country of origin.
H5: Replenished religiosity: We measure opportunities for interaction with re-
cently arrived migrants from Muslim countries with two dummy variables on neighbor-
hood context. These dummy variables indicate if the respondent lives in a neighborhood
located in the top decile at the national level for percentage of 1st generation migrants
from North Africa (corresponding to 40% or more) and Sub-Saharan Africa (19% or
more) living in the respondent’s neighborhood. The neighborhood composition comes
from census data included in the TeO survey. French neighborhoods as defined by the
French census are much smaller than American census tracts, comprising around 2,000
people on average and constitute good proxies for neighborhoods. As for using immi-
grants as a measure of Muslim religious presence, North Africa has historically been
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almost entirely Muslim, and Sub-Saharan African immigration in France comes mostly
from the Sahel region, comprising countries such as Senegal and Mali which feature
large Muslim majorities among their populations (Lagrange 2013).
H6: Neighborhood disadvantage: Finally, we use 4 census measures done at
the tract level to account for neighborhood disadvantage: percentage of neighborhood
inhabitants with only a primary school education, percentage of long-term unemployed
among the unemployed, percentage of social housing, and percentage of large families
(i.e. 5 persons or more per household). Like variables measuring H5, we binarized each
measure and coded those contextual variables as “1" if they were part of the top decile
at the national level, and “0" otherwise7.
Other controls: In addition to the hypothesized predictors of interest, we control
for nativity status (foreign VS French born) as well as age, squared age, sex, professional
status (e.g. working, student, retired, etc) educational attainment (measured as one of
eight categories in the French education system, such as baccalauréat général - general
track in high school - or licence - bachelor’s degree), and parents’ educational attainment
(Scheepers, Te Grotenhuis and Van Der Silk 2002, van Tubergen and Sindradottír 2011).
We also control for respondents born of mixed religious couples and region of origin,
as anthropological research has shown that Islam can be different across geographic and
cultural contexts (Bowen 2012). Finally, we control for the quality of the interview as
reported by the interviewer for each respondent.
7The incentive for binarizing the measures is to simplify the presentation of the results while providing
a more conservative tests for the replenishment hypothesis. Additionally, sensitivity tests with alternative
specifications are performed in section 6.3 on robustness checks. The results obtained are substantively
identical.
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3.6 Results
3.6.1 Cluster analysis
Social & religious heterogeneity in the French native population
Table 1 below reports results from a 4-cluster solution found to best fit the sample of
French native respondents8. We select the 4-cluster solution after a series of 10 diag-
nostic tests (reported in detail in Appendix B) suggesting it to be substantially better
than a 3-cluster one and as well-delineated as the less parsimonious 5- and 6-cluster
ones. Importantly, the clusters are meaningful - forming easily identifiable segments of
the French population with a top value emerging as significantly higher than the next
closest one on all variables except one (Grimmer and King 2010).
These results reveal that native French are segmented into meaningful subgroups,
readily identifiable in terms of social class. Cluster 1 encompasses younger, poorer na-
tives who are not integrated on labor markets. A closer look at its occupational structure
reveals that it features the homemakers and the unemployed respondents of the sample
9. We label this group “socially dependent". Cluster 2 features individuals who are
also earning less and have low educational attainment, but are nevertheless employed -
forming a clear “working class" cluster. Cluster 3 is made up of older individuals, for
the most part working, with a low education and higher income than the two preceding
group. The occupational structure of this group - which we label “lower middle class" -
encompasses low ranking employees and civil servants who are more senior that those
8Continuous values were binarized during the clustering process but are reported in real terms here for
purposes of clarity.
9Tables showing the occupational structure of the obtained clusters are not shown here but are available
upon request.
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Table 3.1: Native French sample characteristics by cluster membership
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
µ female 0.40 0.53 0.50 0.43
(0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Age 30.94 36.92 46.26 36.71
(12.34) (10.39) (9.25) (10.39)
µ with at least a baccalauréat général 0.24 0.12 0.00 1.00
(0.43) (0.33) (0.00) (0.00)
Family income in k 11.66 14.83 21.73 26.56
(6.16) (5.10) (8.70) (10.93)
µ living in a city that is 100k+ 0.55 0.18 0.70 0.66
(0.50) (0.38) (0.46) (0.47)
µ working a job 0.00 1.00 0.97 0.88
(0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.32)
Observations 787 1058 1040 1294
Note: The table reports mean proportions ("µ") and values for variables within each cluster, as
well as their standard deviation within parentheses. The highest value across clusters is in bold if
it is significantly different from the next closest value in other clusters (two-tailed test, p<0.05).
of cluster 2, as well as retirees. Finally, cluster 4 concentrates socially advantaged in-
dividuals with higher human and economic capital - the solid middle class and beyond,
which we label “middle class +".
Does the internal social differentiation of the native French population translate
into diverse religiosity levels, however? Figure 1 below reports the mean religiosity
score for the 4 subgroups making up the native population.
51
Figure 3.1: Religiosity by cluster for native French sample (bars are 95% confi-
dence intervals).
The uncovered subgroups differ in religiosity. There are three distinct groups:
the working, lower middle and middle class and beyond clusters are distinct from each
other, while the socially dependent and middle class and beyond subgroups overlap.
The diversity of the natives in terms of religiosity is consequential to study the process
of assimilation between Muslims and the rest of the French population: if most Muslims
are, for example, socially similar to lower middle class natives, then their high religios-
ity does not constitute as much of a puzzle, since members of this subgroup are more
religious than other groups in France in general. More generally, such internal diversity
evidently calls for a more careful approach to assimilation.
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Cluster affiliation for 1st and 2nd generation Muslims in France.
Figure 3.2: Cluster of reference for Muslims in France, by generation.
Figure 2 presents the results of matching Muslims respondents in the TeO survey to their
socially most proximate subgroup within the native population. Muslims in France are
socially much more diverse than depicted in the literature. The “socially dependent"
category comprises the largest group, with the rest of Muslims in France being more
evenly spread in their cluster of affiliation. The social similarity between foreign and
French born Muslims suggests that immigrant generation is not the best unit of anal-
ysis. In turn, such internal heterogeneity confirms the value of our analytical strategy
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designed to provide more meaningful benchmarks to understand the religiosity gap be-
tween Muslims and their socially closest equivalent in the native population. The next
section describes this gap in detail.
The “religiosity surplus" of Muslims in France
Figure 3 describes the mean deviation in religiosity for Muslims and how they vary de-
pending on their cluster of reference. As expected given the diversity in religiosity of the
French native sample of reference, Muslims’ level of departure from the mainstream is
not uniform across cluster. It is, however, consistently well above 0. Muslims in the so-
cially dependent, working class, and middle class and beyond subgroups are particularly
heterodox compared to socially similar natives.
Figure 3.3: Average surplus in religiosity from native subgroup of reference for
Muslim respondents (bars are 95% confidence intervals).
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To put Muslims’ religiosity surplus in perspective, figure 4 reports average scores
measuring the religiosity differential of immigrant respondents from other self-identified
religious groups, across immigrant generations.
Figure 3.4: Average surplus in religiosity from native subgroup of reference, by
denomination and immigrant generation (bars are 95% confidence in-
tervals)
A dynamic of assimilation is clearly visible for respondents identifying as Chris-
tian, Catholic and Protestant, with a strong inter-generational decay in religiosity down
to levels statistically closer to their cluster of reference. In comparison, Muslims have
a surplus of religiosity from their native subgroups of reference at magnitudes that are
several times larger than other groups.
Where does the “religiosity surplus" come from? To summarize the results so far, we
have shown that Muslims significantly depart from the levels of religiosity of socially
similar French respondents. What social and economic factors could explain such de-
55
parture from native French? We now test the series of hypotheses we outlined earlier.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for variables of interest.
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3.6.2 Results from OLS regression models
Predicting the religiosity surplus by cluster membership
Table 3 presents results from OLS regression models predicting variation in the distance
to the mean religiosity of the respondent’s subgroup of reference in the native popula-
tion. These coefficients were obtained using weights accounting for sampling design
as well as probability of being present in the analytic samples due to missing data, and
robust standard errors. The left column presents a pooled model for all Muslim respon-
dents while the other 4 models present within-cluster regression results.
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When all Muslim respondents are pooled together, the model explains 33.8% of
the variation in Muslims’ religiosity surplus in France. Individual models run by clus-
ter affiliation explain between 28.6% and 57.6% of this variation. Variance inflation
factors run for each model indicate that the results presented here do not suffer from
multicollinearity despite the number of predictors included10.
First, it is important to note that nativity - i.e. being 1st or 2nd generation - is un-
related to Muslims’ difference from French natives. What, then, explain this surplus11?
We find modest evidence for the effect of material deprivation. Family income has
the expected effect across all Muslims, but the within-cluster regression models reveal
that the effect is entirely carried by the working class subgroup, in which the estimates
is almost 70% larger in magnitude than in the pooled model. Conversely, the number
of persons per room in the household, a measure of material comfort, only has the ex-
pected effect in the middle class cluster. The subjective evaluation of one’s situation
and the level of hardship when growing have effects running either in the opposite di-
rection to what was hypothesized or no effect at all. Overall, the material insecurity
hypothesis is not particularly well-suited to explain Muslims’ religiosity surplus. This
result is surprising given the widespread assumption of a strong link between poverty
and religiosity among Muslims often made in the literature (Franz 2007, Lapeyronnie
2008, Kepel 2012a, 2012b)
The rich set of co-variates in the discrimination module of the TeO survey allows
a clear view on the impact of perception as opposed to different types of lived dis-
crimination. First of all, perception per se of discrimination in France is unrelated to
the outcome variable of interest. The experience of discrimination on various grounds,
10We do not include the details of these analyses on variance inflation factors here due to space limita-
tion. They are available upon request.
11We only discuss results relevant to the tests of our hypotheses in the main text. Table 4 in the
Appendix C reports coefficients for control variables, separately from coefficients discussed here.
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however, provide support to the reactive religiosity hypothesis. The effect of having ex-
perienced explicitly religious discrimination is strong and significant for socially depen-
dent and middle class Muslims, while discrimination on physical appearances matters
for those who are working class. In terms of specific places where discrimination has
been experienced, we observe a similar diversity of experience: the socially dependent
are sensitive to discrimination on the housing market while the working class subgroup
reports experiencing discrimination, quite logically, on the workplace. These subtle dif-
ferences by social experiences would have been lost or heavily distorted in a general
model, as indicated by results for the model pooling all Muslims together on the left
column. Overall, these results indicate support for the reactive religiosity hypothesis.
The impact of parental socialization, as indicated by the importance of religion in
the education received from parents, has a consistent and large effect across subgroups.
In the pooled model, the difference between “not important" and “very important" in
the importance of religion in the education imparted by parents to the respondent cor-
responds to a 2.88 increase in the distance to the expected level of religiosity - a 55%
increase from the intercept. Looking at the within-cluster models, however, one can see
that this coefficient varies a lot in magnitude. Parents of respondents in the working
and middle class + subgroups are better at transmitting their religiosity to their children
than parents in the other two clusters. Overall, those results provide strong support to
hypothesis 3 regarding the effect of parental socialization.
The hypothesis regarding the effect of transnationalism also finds support in the
data, with different types of ties at work for different subgroups. Once again, it is
important to note that the pooled model would have been a rather blunt instrument:
it picked up on these effects but with a much more moderate effect size than in the
subgroups where they actually come from.
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The replenished religiosity hypothesis regarding the effect of living in neighbor-
hoods with a large share of recently arrived migrants from Muslim-majority countries is
not supported. This result is surprisingly given the perpetual suspicion on the segregated
banlieue neighborhoods, often depicted as enclaves of religious radicalism at odds with
the norms of the French Republic (Bronner 2010, Kepel 2012a).
Finally, we find mixed support for the neighborhood disadvantage hypothesis
through the consistent and strong effect of living in a neighborhood with a higher per-
centage of large families. Other indicators of neighborhood disadvantage, however, are
unrelated to our dependent variable. This is puzzling, as interpreting the independent
effect of large families is not straightforward. We therefore abstain from elaborating on
the neighborhood disadvantage hypothesis as it receives mixed support from the models
presented here.
Summing up, we find support for the predictors associated with the reactive reli-
giosity, parental socialization, and transnationalism hypotheses (H2, H3, and H4 respec-
tively). Paternoster tests for the equality of coefficients (Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle
and Piquero 1998) confirms that the coefficients for parental socialization, and different
types of discrimination and transnational ties significantly vary across subgroups (table
5 reporting z-scores for the test is available in Appendix D).
In order to put the magnitude of those three sets of variables in perspective, we
computed the predicted change in the respondent’s distance in religiosity from the native
subgroup of reference between two profiles. A respondent in profile 1 grew up with
parents who consider religion to be “very" important, has experienced discrimination
and maintains ties in his country of origin. Profile 2, by contrast, received a parental
education in which religion was only “somewhat" important, has never experienced any
discrimination, and does not maintain any tie with his or her country of origin. Profile
73
1 and 2 are otherwise equal on all other variables, which are set at their respective
means. For the discrimination and transnational ties variables, we only manipulate those
variables which were significant in each cluster (e.g. religious discrimination in cluster
1 and 4 only, sending remittances in cluster 4 only, etc). We report the predicted values
of the religiosity surplus for both profiles and for each cluster in table 4 below.
Table 3.4: Estimated values (standard errors in parentheses) and % decrease in re-
ligiosity surplus between Profile 1 - high parental emphasis on religion,
experiencing discrimination and maintaining transitional ties and Pro-
file 2 - moderate parental emphasis on religion, no experience of dis-
crimination and no transnational ties.Predicted values for Profile 1 and
2 are significantly different across all clusters (two-tailed test, p<0.05).
Profile 1 Profile 2 DP1 P2
C1: Socially dependent 7.03 2.56 -63.58%
(0.32) (0.19)
C2: Working class 6.86 2.80 -59.18%
(0.40) (0.33)
C3: Lower middle class 5.04 1.71 -66.07%
(0.20) (0.24)
C4: Middle class + 6.68 2.54 -61.98%
(0.31) (0.21)
The parental emphasis on religion, the experience of discrimination and the main-
tenance of transnational ties with the country of origin contribute between 59 and 66%
of the religiosity surplus of Muslims in France compared to French natives. A parsi-
monious set of variables thus explain the majority of Muslim immigrants’ distance in
religiosity to comparable French natives.
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3.6.3 Supplementary analyses and robustness checks
In light of its strong effect, we explored potential interactions between parental reli-
gious socialization and our other significant set of predictors, namely discrimination
and transnational ties. It is plausible that higher emphasis on religion in the educa-
tion received from parents could plausibly result in an increased reaction to discrimi-
nation, as well as a more acute awareness of the importance of maintaining ties with
the “old country". We thus ran separate analyses by cluster membership and levels of
parental emphasis on religion. No clear pattern emerges, and discrimination and transna-
tional processes appear to be independent from parental religious socialization. We also
checked for possible interactions of transnational ties and discrimination with gener-
ation, as the ethnographic literature suggests that 2nd generation Muslims experience
these processes differently (Lepoutre 1997, Kepel 2012a, Kapko 2007, Lagrange 2013
chapter 8), but found no difference across generations within each cluster12.
We checked our regression results by testing them with alternative specifications
for certain predictors or sets of predictors. We tested the material deprivation hypothe-
sis with only one predictor (just family income or just number of persons per room in
the household) instead of the high number included in the main models. We tested the
replenishment and neighborhood hypotheses with ordered categorical as well as linear
specification by decile rather than the dummies for top decile used in the main mod-
els. These alternative specifications produced results which were substantively identical
from those presented here13.
Another series of robustness checks attempted to gauge the effect of selection
in our estimation of the effect of discrimination. More religious Muslims might be,
12We choose not to include these results here due to space limitations and the already heavy number of
tables and figures. They are available upon request.
13idem.
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for various reasons, more likely to be discriminated against in the first place and this
could confound the effect of discrimination. We thus ran separate models for individuals
who “never" wore a religious sign and others who “sometimes" or “always" wore one
- with the assumption that those with a visible sign are more likely to be discriminated
against14. The results show that the effect of religious discrimination is substantially
reduced - but still significant - for those who “never" wear a religious sign. This suggests
either a selection process or a stronger reaction or perception to discrimination among
those wearing a religious sign. Additional models run for each dimension of religiosity
for those who “never" wear a sign still show a widespread association of several types of
discrimination with higher departure from expected levels of religiosity. Experiencing
institutional discrimination is associated with a higher deviation from expected levels of
religious attendance and subjective importance of religion in one’s personal life, while
discrimination on religious and national grounds is related to higher respect of dietary
constraints15.
More generally, it is likely that both selection and reactive religiosity processes are
simultaneously active. Recent experimental work in France has shown specifically reli-
gious discrimination against Muslims to be at work, thus reinforcing Muslims’ cultural
affiliation with their country of origin and creating a self-reinforcing dynamic of distrust
and polarization (Adida, Valfort and Laitin 2016). This deeply endogenous relationship
between discrimination and cultural “otherness" - high religiosity in this particular study
- is discussed in detail in the next section.
14We attempted to obtain estimates for the “net" effect of discrimination using propensity score match-
ing but unfortunately the common support region to carry out the analyses was too small between the
treated and untreated groups.
15Since both the main text and the appendix already feature a heavy number of tables and figure, those
additional models are not included here and are available upon request.
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3.7 Discussion
3.7.1 Taking social heterogeneity seriously: uncovering subgroups
and parallel social processes
Theoretical work on immigration and social boundaries has repeatedly called for a care-
ful analysis of the internal diversity inherent to both native and immigrant groups (Alba
and Nee 2003, Portes and Zhou 1993). This concern is especially prominent in the work
of scholars warning against “groupist" thinking in sociology and emphasizing the need
for a reflexive use of social categories like ethnicity and religion so as to avoid essen-
tialist accounts of bounded, homogenous and solidary groups (Brubaker 2004, 2013,
Wimmer 2013). This call for reflexivity is the analytical counterpart to more politi-
cal concerns about essentialist representations of the “other" in postcolonial theorizing
(Said 1979) and the emerging scholarship on contemporary Islamophobia (Taras 2013).
While qualitative inquiries on Islam in Europe have been attentive to these questions and
careful not to assume Muslims form a bounded and homogeneous group (Bowen 2007,
2012, Kapko 2007, Kepel 2012, Beaman 2015a), quantitative scholars have method-
ologically assumed Muslims and Islam as relatively fixed entities, often adding religion
as a dummy variable in a multivariate regression, or taking for granted religious groups
to be the natural unit of analysis (for recent critiques of this approach in the scholar-
ship on race and ethnicity, see Brubaker 2004, Wimmer 2013). The analytical strategy
we have proposed and implemented here seeks to actively engage with these theoreti-
cal calls for reflexivity and attention to within-group heterogeneity. Given the growing
politicization and suspicion Muslims are the object of as an often essentialized minority
group, we consider this effort to be particularly timely and important.
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Besides concern about essentialism, this strategy led to important analytical pay-
offs. An analysis taking for granted religious affiliation or immigrant generation as the
proper unit of analysis would have yielded blunt and inaccurate results - as indicated
by the results of the pooled model compared to subgroup specific models in table 3.
We interpret coefficient differences between subgroups as reflecting a diversity of social
experiences which existing research can help us contextualize further.
The first subgroup has been the subject of past ethnographic work focusing on
the experience of marginalized Muslims - economically vulnerable individuals living in
segregated neighborhoods and keenly aware of the religious and spatial stigma affecting
them (Lepoutre 1997, Franz 2007, Kepel 2012a, Lagrange 2013). The coefficients for
religious and housing discrimination - the latter reflecting the prevalence of stigmatized
social housing (so called HLM) in immigrant neighborhoods - suggest just that. One
also notices that the effect of parental socialization is weaker compared to other groups
- something reminiscent of the qualitative observations on young, Muslim men who are
in conflict with their parents on religious matters (Kepel 2012b, Lagrange 2013 chapter
8). Crucially, nascent work on Islamic radicalization in France suggests that, if it mostly
occur among Muslim families, it does so outside of the parental purview - either in
the neighborhood, in prison or on the Internet (Thomson 2016). Existing portraits of
young jihadists further suggest that a feeling of alienation, discrimination and a lack
of integration on labor markets - key characteristics of cluster 1 - play an important
role in the radicalization process (Khosrokhavar 2014, Thomson 2016; see also Institut
Montaigne 2016).
At the opposite end of the social spectrum, recent research on the Muslim middle
class in France can help us further understand the results for cluster 4 (Beaman 2015a,
Institut Montaigne 2016). Muslims raised in middle class homes are able to appropri-
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ate their parents’ heritage on their own term rather than being coerced into it (Beaman
2015a: 12-15). This contrasts with other studies of Islam in the banlieues, where the
control of parents and elder brothers is notorious (Lapeyeronnie 2008, Kepel 2012a,
2012b). A less forceful religious socialization can lead to a more voluntary embrace of
Islam as a form of self-actualization, and thus explain the tremendous effect of parental
socialization for middle class Muslims. Additionally, a higher level of education bring-
ing expectations of social mobility, fair treatment and a belief in the national Republican
ideology can help explain this subgroup’s particular sensitivity to discrimination on re-
ligious and national grounds (Beaman 2015b).
It is harder to contextualize the results of clusters 2 and 3 due to the lack of ex-
isting research. The importance of transnational ties along with the absence of reported
discrimination is a defining aspect of the lower middle class’ religious trajectory and
one deserving of further scholarly attention. Cluster 2 appears slightly more familiar.
The strong effect of parental socialization and the experience of discrimination at work
are reminiscent of ethnographic work on 1st generation migrants fromMuslim countries
in Sub-Saharan Africa (Lagrange 2013). Lagrange describes the religiosity of industrial
workers and their families from rural Sénégal and Mali who remain attached to Islam in
part to cope with harsh social conditions in France - including deindustrialization and
the lack of jobs. This perspective is that of 1st generation migrants, however, and cluster
2 features an even mix of native and foreign born. More work on working class Muslims
is needed to understand their particular religious trajectory in France.
More generally, those results suggest that it is necessary to empirically deconstruct
labels such as “Muslim" (Brubaker 2013), “immigrant" (Garip 2012), or “mainstream"
(Alba and Nee 2003). The diversity of social processes at work among different sub-
groups existing under the umbrella of one religious category suggests that a more induc-
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tive, data-driven approach to determine the relevant units of analysis in the assimilation
process is necessary. The approach we used can be adapted for the analysis of other
questions relating to immigrant incorporation and implying a comparison with natives
while retaining the heterogeneity of both populations.
3.7.2 Immigrant mode of entry and the making of a negative cul-
tural equilibrium
We showed that a parsimonious set of variables - family socialization, transnational ties
and the experience of discrimination - explains approximately 60% of the religiosity sur-
plus of Muslim immigrants in France. What do these findings suggest for assimilation
theory and what do they contribute to immigration research in general?
A proper interpretation of these findings requires historicizing the Muslim pres-
ence in France, and Europe in general. Today’s Muslim minorities are yesterday’s guest
workers and their children. Those workers came to Europe in the late 1950s and 1960s
in search of better salaries in the postwar economic boom, without intending, or being
provided with institutional pathways to stay permanently (Laurence 2012). The 1973
Oil Crisis resulted in an economic recession and rising unemployment, leading Western
European governments to freeze all guest worker programs. Workers who were already
in Europe wanted to preserve their professional future and thus started to bring their
family members while hoping that guest worker programs would resume (Moch 2003:
187-188). In the late 1970s, the French government encouraged return migration by
offering cash incentives - the “million Stoléru" equivalent to around 1500 - and discour-
aged new migration by increasing penalties on undocumented migrants. Those policy
initiatives were largely unsuccessful, however, and by 1981 around 1.5 million migrants
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from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey were present in France. The politicization
of immigration and immigrant integration then rose in the 1980s as it became clear that
those guest workers were in fact becoming permanent minorities (Castles 1986, Noiriel
1996, Moch 2003, Laurence 2012).
The exogenous shock at the origin of the sudden halt of worker programs - the
1973 Oil Crisis - and the following ambiguities regarding the future and status of ex-
guest workers and their families produced a specific mode of entry of migrants from
Muslim societies in France, one that was not fully voluntary like earlier migration waves
from nearby European countries (Moch 2003). Guest workers and their families who,
by and large, did not plan on permanently migrating found themselves as involuntary
minorities (Ogbu and Simons 1998) in a culturally threatening context, i.e. one charac-
terized by secularism. They thus had an incentive to maintain and transmit their religious
belief systems to their children as well as links to the country of origin. Meanwhile, their
unexpected presence generated widespread cultural anxiety once the economic boom
came to a halt in the mid-1970s. Controversies regarding the accommodation of Mus-
lim practices and religiosity emerged a decade later, such as the first “veil affair" in
1989.
In light of their mode of entry as guest workers accidentally becoming permanent
minorities, we can think of the process generating and maintaining a high religiosity
surplus among Muslim immigrants and their children in France as a negative cultural
equilibrium. Immigrants from Muslim countries imported high religiosity levels that
they successfully transmitted to their children, while maintaining ties with the country
of origin. This high level of religiosity made them suspicious and liable to stigma and
discrimination in the French secular context (Bowen 2007) - thus reinforcing an initial
cultural difference through reactive religiosity, in a circular motion. This narrative is
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consistent with recent experimental work on the “negative discriminatory equilibrium"
affectingMuslims in France (Adida, Valfort and Laitin 2016). Using experimental meth-
ods, Adida, Valfort and Laitin show that there exists a specific type of discrimination
against Muslims in France, above and beyond race, and that this discrimination feeds
off native perceptions of Muslims’ religious and gender norms (ibid chapter 6). Muslim
immigrants perceive and react to this discrimination by maintaining a high attachment
to their culture of origin and a low level of identification with France.
Theoretically, our findings thus point the lasting effects of immigrants’ mode of
entry for assimilation. While recent research on migration in Europe suggests that mi-
grants’ cultural heterodoxy develops endogenously as a response to inequality (Wimmer
and Soehl 2014), our work shows that Muslims’ religiosity surplus compared to socially
similar segments of the French native population is both exogenous (the importance of
parental socialization in transmitting high religiosity levels inherited from the country of
origin, as well as transnational ties) and endogenous (the experience of discrimination
from French natives) to the context of reception. More generally, the strong explanatory
power of this set of variables suggests that Muslims living in France experience a lasting
status of involuntary minority spanning differences across subgroups and generations.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper has documented a phenomenon of delayed religious assimilation among
Muslims - 99.6% of whom are immigrants - in France. Using a new analytical strat-
egy accounting for the heterogeneity of both the immigrant and the native reference
group, we found that parental socialization, transnational ties and the experience of dis-
criminations explain approximately 60% of Muslims’ religiosity surplus compared to
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socially similar French natives. While we documented different trajectories across sub-
groups within the Muslim population, we interpret the consistent effect of these three
sets of variables as reflecting a negative cultural equilibrium stemming from the ac-
cidental mode of entry of Muslims as involuntary minorities who were originally not
supposed to permanently settle in France.
In closing, a few remarks about the limitations and potential prospects opened by
our study are in order. Despite its large sample and unusually high number of covari-
ates, the data used here are only cross-sectionnal. This undoubtedly constitutes a strong
limitation, as assimilation is an inherently dynamic and temporal process. Certain mech-
anisms hypothesized to be at work here, such as reactive religiosity, are hard to observe
without confounders in observational data despite their strong theoretical foundations.
Experimental and longitudinal data are needed to further study the processes at work
among Muslims in France (see Adida, Valfort and Laitin 2016 for a recent experimental
example on discrimination).
Finally, let us restate an important theoretical point: heterogeneity matters. Schol-
ars of migration and intergroup relations can and should be wary of taking evident so-
cial categories of the migration process, such as immigrants or Muslims, as their natural
units of analysis. The “Muslim" label covers a diversity of social trajectories. Our em-
pirical approach consisting in decomposing Muslims and natives in cohesive subgroups,
as well as our documenting of parallel social processes at work among them, has made
clear that a careful deconstruction of bounded groups to avoid their reification is not a
fashionable intellectual posture but a strong analytical imperative.
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3.9 Appendix A: Background on the Muslim presence in Europe
Contemporary Muslim immigration dates back to the migration flows of foreign male
workers brought in to help rebuild Europe after World War Two. Stimulated by the
Marshall Plan, European economies were in full swing during the 1950s and 1960s and
relied on bilateral treaties to temporarily import a much needed extra-manpower from
countries with which they had close ties inherited from colonialism or historical al-
liances. Britain thus relied on Pakistani and Indian workers, Germany on Turkish ones,
and France on Moroccan, Tunisian and Algerian ones. Those male workers sought em-
ployment abroad because the better pay allowed them to send remittances to their home
country; in turn, national governments were happy not to worry about their integration
since it was a straightforward guest worker arrangement in which workers would volun-
tarily return to their home countries (Laurence 2012). Workers rotated freely between
countries and their presence or culture did not generate widespread hostility in Europe at
the time. It was in fact quite the opposite: upwardly mobile European workers happily
gave away their manufacturing and construction jobs as they entered the middle class en
masse (Noiriel 1996, Laurence 2012).
This political and social arrangement came to a brutal halt in 1974 when Western
economies fell into recession as a result of the first oil shock. Unemployment sharply
rose and European governments stopped all flows of foreign workers. Those who were
in Europe at the time stayed, and migration flows virtually changed overnight, from
male workers to the family members those workers had left behind. The Muslim pres-
ence in Europe has since then been deeply contentious and coincided with the rise of
identity, immigration and immigrant integration as objects of political debates (Noiriel
1996. In Germany, these tensions took the form of important debates on the reform
of nationality law and the public funding of Islamic religious institutions (Joppke and
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Torpey 2013) while debates revolved around mutliculturalism in Great Britain and the
Netherlands. In France, policy and scholarly debates revolved around the integration
of Muslim practices and claims in the existing church-state institutional framework of
“la¨é" (secularism), promoting a strict relegation of religion to the private sphere (Bowen
2007). Several “veil affairs" and requests for dietary accommodation in public schools
have, in particular, generated much controversy.
Muslims are now the largest and fastest growing religious minority in Europe,
making up 3.5% of the national population on average in Western European countries
(Laurence 2012, Pew Research Center 2015). Muslims in France, however, represent 7
to 8% of the national population, accounting for around 4.5 million people forming the
largest Muslim minority relative to the national population in Europe (ibid).
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3.10 Appendix B: Cluster validationmeasures to determine the best
number of clusters in the sample of French natives
Figure 3.5: Cluster validation measures across number of clusters for French na-
tive sample
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This study uses ten validation measures to choose the number of clusters used to break
down the native French reference sample in several reference categories. They were
computed using the NbClust and ClValid packages in the R environment. We briefly
explain how to interpret each measure below. For more detail on each measure, see
Kaufman and Rousseeauw 2005, Brock et al. 2008, Liu et al. 2010 Charrad et al. 2014.
• The Connectivity measure indicates the degree of connectedness of the clusters.
It should be minimized.
• The Silhouette Width index is a measure of cluster compactness and separation.
It should be maximized.
• The Dunn index is a measure of cluster compactness and separation. It should be
maximized.
• The Figure of Merit is a measure of cluster stability and should be minimized.
• The SDBW index is a measure of cluster separation and density. The SDBW
index should be minimized.
• The Krzanowski and Lai index is a measure of cluster separation and should be
maximized.
• The average distance between cluster means is a measure of cluster stability and
should be minimized.
• The average proportion of non-overlap is a measure of cluster stability and should
be minimized.
• The average within-cluster distance indicates cluster stability and should be mini-
mized.
• The within-groups sum of squares is a measure of cluster compactness and should
be minimized.
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The results indicate that a 4-cluster solution yields the best compromise between
producing well-defined clusters and parsimony. Additionally, we evaluated cluster qual-
ity on how differentiated the defined clusters were on the variables included when run-
ning the kmeans algorithm. As reported in table 1, the top proportion in each cluster
is statistically significant from the next lowest value for all variables but one (gender).
This is superior to the 3-, 5-cluster and 6-cluster solution, in which 2 or 3 variables have
ties for top values, indicating lower cluster definition. Finally, and importantly, we used
the human perception criterion (Grimmer & King 2010) to determine if the proposed
solutions formed meaningful - i.e. interpretable - clusters, in which the 4- and 5-cluster
solution emerged as forming the most easily recognizable subgroups.
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3.11 Appendix C: Controls included in the OLS regression models
but not presented in the main table
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3.12 Appendix D: Z-scores from Paternoster tests for coefficients
equality
Z-score testing for coefficient equality adapted from Paternoster et al. (1998), in which
the z-score for the difference between two coefficients b1 and b2 is given by:
Z =
(b1 b2)q
SEb21+SEb
2
2
(3.1)
The table below gives the z-scores for all 6 pairs of clusters being tested for equal-
ity of coefficients:
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Table 3.6: Z-scores for pairwise Paternoster tests for regression coefficients equal-
ity, for all 6 possible pairs of clusters. Note: Bolded and italicized
z-scores indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis of equality of coef-
ficients (two-tailed test, p<0.05 and p<0.10 respectively).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1-2 1-3 1-4 2-3 2-4 3-4
Level of parental emphasis on religion -2.26 -1.08 -3.36 1.33 -0.87 -2.41
Transnational ties:
Ties with family & friends 1.42 0.15 2.23 -1.02 0.69 1.65
Transnational remittances 0.45 0.80 -1.02 0.25 -1.30 -1.73
Transnational investment -0.56 -0.99 1.60 -0.44 2.17 2.57
Discrimination:
Religious discrimination 1.75 0.79 0.58 -0.43 0.99 -0.33
Discrimination on physical appearance -1.47 0.14 0.86 1.31 2.11 0.56
Housing discrimination 2.26 1.72 1.08 -0.84 -1.61 -0.88
Institutional discrimination 0.93 1.20 -0.30 0.30 -1.07 -1.31
Workplace discrimination -2.07 -1.45 -0.88 0.18 0.99 0.65
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CHAPTER 4
STIGMA AND BELONGING AMONG THE RISING IMMIGRANT ELITE IN
FRANCE
Introduction
Postwar migration flows have reshaped the demographic composition of Western liberal
societies towards unprecedented diversity, remaking the ethnic and religious makeup
of urban areas where immigrants predominantly settle. Despite low levels of human
capital and modest social origins on average, many members of North African, Turkish
and South Asian migrant groups to Europe - including the native-born second generation
- have experienced upward mobility towards the upper-middle class, while others have
come as skilled migrants and successfully converted their human capital into desirable
labor market positions.
Individual success stories in the realms of sports, business and politics have ac-
companied this slow but real incursion in the European spotlight. Yet, remarkably little
is known about the lives of upwardly mobile individuals of immigrant origins, and schol-
ars have only recently taken an interest in the new immigrant elites (e.g. Crul, Keskiner
and Lelie 2017). Yet, the experience of the immigrant upper-middle class is relevant
insofar as it involves articulating belonging in starkly different groups: the immigrant
community on one hand - often poor and stigmatized as culturally different - and oc-
cupational groups commanding large amounts of honor and prestige among natives on
the other (Bourdieu 1984, Lamont 1992). Of particular interest are upwardly mobile
immigrants’ interactional tactics, ways of presenting oneself, fitting in and managing
stigma in spaces dominated by members of the native majority. Such “minority cultures
of mobility" (Neckerman, Carter and Lee 1999) reflect efforts to attain cultural mem-
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bership - being viewed as valued and respected members of their society of settlement
(Lamont and Molnár 2002: 188-189). As such, they can afford researchers a sharper
look at the relationship between social mobility and assimilation - one often assumed
in assimilation theory (Alba and Nee 2003, Waters and Jiménez 2005, Gans 2007) but
rarely studied empirically.
In this paper, I examine the subjective experience of ethnoracial and religious
stigma among upper-middle class immigrants in France. How do successful immigrants
respond to lived and perceived challenges regarding their belonging to French society?
How do they articulate class, ethnicity, and religion to handle stigma and claim mem-
bership in the imagined French community? Using qualitative data from thirty eight
in-depth interviews with immigrant professionals, I show that upwardly mobile immi-
grants use the symbolic resources afforded by their upper-middle class status to deflect
stigmatization and disempower the use of ethnic and racial categories against them by,
in return, stigmatizing racism as culturally inferior, backwards and illegitimate. I argue
that this is enabled by the French repertoire of cultural elitism (Lamont 1992) as well
as the lack of currency of ethnoracial categories in formal and informal institutions like
laws and cultural norms, which results in upper-middle class immigrants adopting the
cultural codes and scripts of the native white, upper-middle class without much tension
or contradiction. Conversely, the qualitative data shows that Muslim respondents ex-
perience a more intense and peculiar form of religious stigma casting them as cultural
outsiders despite high levels of socioeconomic integration. Unlike their non-Muslim
counterparts, I find that Muslim respondents have difficulty reversing stigma and in-
stead try to differentiate themselves from undesirable, self-identified Muslims giving
their religion a bad name - such as perpetrators of terror attacks. The situation faced
by Muslim respondents reflects the absence of cultural repertoires making religion a
plausible way to claim belonging in France - especially in a time period when suspicion
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against Muslims have become generalized. By emphasizing the role of cultural reper-
toires in enabling and disabling claims for belonging, the study sheds light on symbolic
aspects of immigrant incorporation often neglected in past work. It suggests that, con-
trary to the implicit assumptions of assimilation theory (Alba and Nee 2003, Waters and
Jiménez 2005), socioeconomic mobility does not necessary leads to inclusion as “one
of us" by the native majority. Symbolic inclusion among immigrants remains, instead,
actively negotiated and struggled upon after upward mobility has been achieved.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. It first assesses the emerging empir-
ical literature on the immigrant elite and the subjective social experience of upwardly
mobile immigrants in the United States and Europe. It then develops a theoretical back-
ground to understand the challenges and symbolic struggles associated with social mo-
bility among recent immigrants. It then introduces the research question, qualitative
design, and main results of the study, contrasting the subjective experience of Muslim
and non-Muslim respondents. The final section discusses the relevance of the results for
assimilation and revisits the links between social mobility, assimilation and belonging
among upwardly mobile immigrants.
4.1 Empirical background: the rise of an immigrant elite in West-
ern countries of immigration
The postwar period coincided, in manyWestern countries, with substantial demographic
change brought about by new, extra-European migration flows. In the United States, the
1965 Hart-Celler act ended past policies based on nationality quotas and significantly
increased migration from Asia, as well as Central and South America. In Europe, recon-
struction efforts relied heavily on immigrant guest workers from countries with whom
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Western governments had bilateral agreements - e.g. Turkey with Germany, Maghribi
countries with France, and India and Pakistan in the United Kingdom. After the First
Oil Shock in 1973, many guest workers chose to stay in Europe after rotating work pro-
grams ended and brought their immediate relatives through family reunification. These
migration flows have remained relatively constant in size over time and the proportion
of foreign born has kept increasing to attain unprecedented highs on both sides of the
Atlantic (Pew Research Center 2015, OECD 2018).
Upwardly mobile immigrant groups in the United States: between
racialization and hyphenated identities
In the United States, an empirical consensus exists on a general dynamic of upward
mobility in the post-1965 immigration - often taken as a sign of assimilation (Alba and
Nee 2003, Waterns and Jiménez 2005, White and Glick 2009). As such, a new literature
has started to document the emergence of an immigrant middle and upper middle class.
Among Asian immigrant groups, extraordinarily high educational and occupational at-
tainment has led to the image of a “model minority" (Hsin and Xie 2014, Lee and Zhou
2015) and change in the meaning of educational success in areas where Asian upper-
middle class families settle (Jiménez and Horowitz 2013). Yet, qualitative work has
documented the residual salience of race in the subjective experience of upper-middle
class Asian professionals (Dhingra 2007) as well as that of the emerging Mexican mid-
dle class (Vasquez 2011, Vallejo 2012). This has prompted some to talk of “racialized
assimilation" (Lee and Kye 2016) or “assimilation in spite of racialization" (Vasquez
2011) to describe the trajectory of the successful second generation. This literature
echoes some findings from scholars on the Black middle class evolving and negotiating
the color line in elite social milieus dominated by Whites (e.g. Lacy 2007).
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While social mobility translates into identifying asWhite among some segments of
upwardly mobile immigrants in the US (Emeka and Vallejo 2011), immigration scholars
have also documented the salience of hyphenated identities in which ethnicity and so-
cioeconomic success are not mutually exclusive (Vallejo 2012, Dhingra 2007, Jiménez
and Horowitz 2013). In her study of the Mexican American middle class, Vallejo (2012)
describes a variety of ethnic identifications across individuals - fromWhite identification
away from the Mexican community, to those joining ethnic association, with others in-
between engaging in optional (Waters 1990) forms of Mexican ethnicity (e.g. food, oc-
casional festivities, etc). Despite dynamics of racialization, the social legitimacy of hy-
phenated identities provide flexibility in articulating ethnic and class belonging among
socially successful immigrants in the United States, where claiming membership in par-
ticular ethnic groups is considered part and parcel of the mainstream (Alba and Nee
2003).
The emerging immigrant middle class in Western Europe
By contrast, the European literature on the immigrant middle, let alone upper middle
class, is in its infancy. This should not be surprising in light of the overwhelmingly
working-class origins of postwar migration in Europe, which has made social ascen-
dancy to higher class status a long, multi-generational endeavor due to dynamics of
social reproduction (Heath, Rothon and Kilpi 2008). Yet a new generation of immigrant
elites is emerging, as seen most visibly in the realm of politics (Alba and Foner 2015
chapter 7).
While scholars have recently sought a better understanding of the structural de-
terminants of pathways of upward mobility among the second generation (Crul et al.
2012, Crul, Keskiner and Lelie 2017), research on the subjective experience of up-
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wardly mobile immigrants remains rare. Beaman’s (2015) work on the religious identity
of the Muslim middle class and Shahrokni (2015)’s research on the culture of mobility
among upwardly mobile North Africans student in France, however, provide vivid il-
lustrations of the contradictions induced by a double status of socioeconomic insiders
and ethnoreligious outsiders. Beaman’s respondents consciously adopt the official cul-
tural repertoires regarding laïcité and secularism to frame their religious practices as
compatible with cultural tenets of the French Republic. Shahkroni’s respondents tended
throughout their studies in elite schools to congregate with individuals of similar class
and ethnoracial backgrounds to maintain a sense of community, yet found that this very
solidarity stereotyped them as unable or unwilling to integrate in the eyes of their native
peers, furthering a sense of pre-existing isolation. The difficulties in articulating mul-
tiple identities arise in a context where the official ideology of Republicanism has long
discouraged the expression of ethnic and religious particularisms, focusing instead on
citizenship (Brubaker 1992, Bowen 2012).
4.2 Theoretical background: Symbolic boundaries, immigrant up-
ward mobility and assimilation
The qualitative literature on the immigrant elites thus documents important residual
barriers to the full inclusion of immigrants from middle and upper-middle class back-
grounds. In this section, I mobilize the literature on social and symbolic boundaries
as well as assimilation to re-examine the theoretical links between social mobility and
belonging among upwardly mobile immigrants.
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Struggling over belonging: the boundary making perspective
Sociologists of inequality have long recognized the cultural dimensions of social clo-
sure (e.g. Weber (1978 [1922]: 305-307, Bourdieu 1984) and more recently advanced
the concept of symbolic boundary (Lamont and Molnár 2002). This effort is part of
a growing literature building on the concept of boundary and boundary making (Barth
1968) to shed light on the relational nature of class (Lamont 1992) and ethnic (Wimmer
2013) inequality and group making. Symbolic boundaries are conceptual distinctions
drawn to categorize people and informing a sense “us" and “them". As cultural pro-
ducers of social stratification, symbolic boundaries are the object of power struggles,
and “groups compete in the production, diffusion, and institutionalization of alterna-
tive systems and principles of classification" (Lamont and Molnár 2002, 168). When
symbolic boundaries are widely agreed upon however, they result in large macro-level
outcome such as legally enforced segregation or stable peace among nation-states - so
called social boundaries (ibid). Symbolic boundaries can be regarded as a necessary but
insufficient cause for social boundaries.
Struggles upon symbolic boundaries are enacted in everyday life through stigma-
tization and discrimination events1. The constitutive categories of insiders and outsiders
are contextual, and comparative work shows that symbolic boundaries do not always co-
alesce along ethnic and racial lines (Wimmer 2013). Rather, the production, perception
and interpretation of stigma are informed by available cultural frames, scripts and narra-
tives - i.e. cultural repertoires - which are themselves located in larger, path-dependent
historical processes (Lamont et al. 2016). In the context of immigrant incorporation,
1Following Lamont, Silva, Welburn, Guetzkow, Mizrachi, Herzog and Reis 2016, I define discrimina-
tion as the withdrawing of certain opportunities and resources solely in virtue of one’s national, ethnic and
racial background. By contrast, I define stigmatization as subjectively felt challenges to one’s belonging
and self-worth in virtue of one’s national, ethnic or racial background unfolding in the course of everyday
interactions.
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stigmatization from natives is likely to occur towards immigrants they perceive to be
irrevocably different and outside the imagined community (Bail 2008, Schachter 2016).
Conversely, immigrants have to actively handle and respond to stigma in order to claim
inclusion and parity with natives. In the United States for instance, historical case studies
suggest that the imagined community has long been shaped by the Black-White distinc-
tion - a widely agreed upon symbolic boundaries until well into the twentieth century
(Fox and Guglielmo 2012). As such, various immigrant groups have striven to “become
White" or at least avoid being seen as Black - as in the case of the Irish (Ignatiev 1995),
Italians (Orsi 1992) or the Chinese of the Mississippi delta (Loewen 1971).
Assimilation beyond immigrant social mobility
Following massive institutional change outlawing racial discrimination within Western
liberal societies after World War II, immigration scholars have typically considered im-
migrant social mobility to be a sufficient cause for boundary shifting and assimilation
with natives (Alba and Nee 2003, Waters and Jiménez 2005, White and Glick 2009;
See Shachter 2016 and Gans 2007 for more detail). This derives from a structural the-
orization of the mainstream, defined as the social spaces wherein ethnic and related
differences cease to influence life chances and opportunities (Alba and Nee 2003:12).
Yet, recent research strongly suggests that today’s native communities of “us" are
still constituted by a subjective dimension - one that is independent of socioeconomic
status and formal equality of opportunity between naturalized immigrants and natives
under the rule of law. As such, the extent to which upward mobility leads particular
categories of “otherness" (such as race or religion) to naturally recede towards irrele-
vance, and thus inclusion by the native majority, remains unclear. In the United States,
experimental research suggests that White Americans continue to perceive non-White
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immigrants as substantially different from themselves regardless of said immigrants’ le-
gal status or occupational attainment (Schachter 2016). In European nation-states whose
polities have historically been more predicated upon cultural homogeneity than North
American settler societies (Brubaker 1992, Alba and Foner 2015), native populations
hold context-specific, yet clear preferences for cultural similarity among new immi-
grants (Bail 2008). While causality remains ambiguous, recent comparative evidence
suggests strong links between immigrants’ well-being, acculturation levels, and percep-
tions of discrimination (Angellini et al. 2015, Beier and Kroeneberg 2013, Safi 2010).
Stigmatization on grounds of religious difference appears, in particular, to impact the
social experience of Muslim minorities regardless of their level of socioeconomic at-
tainment (Simon and Safi 2013, Adida et al. 2016).
In short, recent evidence in the United States and Europe suggests that structural
attainment does not equate full inclusion among upwardly mobile immigrants. More
generally, the rise to prominence of far right populist movements campaigning on na-
tivist or civilizationist themes (Brubaker 2017) bears witness to the resilience of the
cultural dimension of belonging, and highlights the influence of native majority in ne-
gotiating the boundary movement at the heart of the assimilation process. In formal
theoretical terms, immigrant’s location in a specific web of affiliations (Simmel 1955)
- simultaneous membership in social categories like gender, ethnicity, religion, occu-
pation or nation - offers natives ways of excluding and classifying as outsiders those
members of the ingroup that are also members of contested or undesirable outgroups. In
Goffman’s words, the upwardly mobile immigrant’s dilemma is thus that of “possessing
an attribute that makes him different from others in the category of persons available for
him to be, and of a less desirable kind [...], a trait [...] breaking the claim that his other
attributes have on us. He possesses a stigma, an undesired differentedness from what we
had anticipated" (Goffman 1963: 2-5). The layering of “desirable" and “undesirable"
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attributes complicates the study of assimilation of upwardly mobile immigrants. Which
attribute is sufficient for inclusion as “one of us"? More importantly, which attributes
(dis)qualifies for cultural membership?
4.3 Research question, analytic strategy and data
The boundary strategies and specific “minority culture of mobility" (Neckerman, Carter
and Lee 1999) deployed by the new immigrant elite to claim membership in the main-
stream offer a critical approach to study the cultural dimensions of assimilation beyond
a structural focus on social mobility. In this study, I focus on upper-middle class immi-
grants in France and ask: how do socially successful members of otherwise stigmatized
minorities negotiate their belonging in France? How do they face and respond to stigma
from natives to assert membership in the national community?
I use in-depth interviewing with thirty-eight immigrant professionals to tackle this
question. Focusing on their experience of discrimination and stigmatization, I exploit
the phenomenological potential of the in-depth interviewing method - i.e. its capacity
to uncover respondents’ subjective view of the world - to study the “boundary work"
individuals engage in to negotiate their belonging in France when such belonging is
challenged. By boundary work (Lamont 1992, 2000), I mean the conceptual, discur-
sive distinctions people use to differentiate among, and locate oneself in specific social
groups.
In the absence of detailed ethnic statistics (Simon 2008), sampling interviewees
for such a rare and hard-to-reach population poses substantial logistic challenges, and I
therefore resorted to snowball sampling to recruit participants. I used occupation and ed-
ucational attainment to identify class background. None of the individuals interviewed
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came from a long lineage of elites in their respective country of origin, and I therefore
regard upward mobility and upper-middle class status as synonymous in the context of
this study. I used skin color, national origin and immigrant status to identify ethnoracial
difference. This recruitment strategy led to a group of highly educated professionals of
North and Sub-Saharan African background. All but one held French citizenship. Six-
teen interviewees were female, and twenty-three were French born (conversely, fifteen
were first generation immigrants). Appendix B provides further demographic detail on
the respondents in this study.
Interviews were carried out in the Paris area as well as mid-sized cities in Eastern
France, and took place in public places or in the respondent’s office or home. They
lasted 75 minutes on average with a minimum of 42 and a maximum of 128 minutes.
All interviews featured the same set of open questions probing for the participants’ sub-
jective sense of membership in the national cultural community as well as experience of
stigmatization and discrimination. Substantial time was devoted to eliciting definitions
and normative views (i.e. boundary work) on what it means to be French, race, racism
and other core topics related to belonging. There was variation in the later parts of the
interviews as probing and follow-up questions depended on answers to earlier questions.
A copy of the interview guide is featured in Appendix A. The Muslim-non Muslim di-
vide appeared to be salient early on in the project. I thus focused on interviewingMuslim
respondents for the later stages of fieldwork, yielding seventeen self-identified Muslims
out of thirty interviewees.
Complete transcription, first stage coding and interviewing occurred simultane-
ously as part of fieldwork. Analytic coding, partial transcription and additional in-
terviews characterized the later stages of the research process (Charmaz and Belgrave
2002).
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4.4 A qualitative view of belonging among upper-middle class im-
migrants
4.4.1 Proud members of the Republic: mapping the national com-
munity and claiming membership
The vast majority of respondents reported a strong attachment with the national cul-
tural community and had positive feelings toward mainstream French institutions (e.g.
schools, criminal justice, etc). When asked to define what they meant by being French,
they typically mobilized the repertoires of the Enlightenment and French Republican-
ism - a national ideology born out of the 1789 Revolution which regards belonging to
the nation as a matter of individual will rather than ascriptive criteria such as ethnicity
(Brubaker 1992). In doing so, they framed their personal success stories of occupational
mobility as part of a longer tradition of colorblind and civic inclusion. This narrative,
derived from official public culture, was used to cast nativism and ethnic exclusion as
un-French. A West African born medical professional explains:
“I think I am a fine French citizen and that I am able to talk about French culture
just as well as those who claim only they really belong. Sometimes, I encounter people
who are a little rigid about all of this and I tell them “this is not what French culture is
all about".
Q: You mean, racism?
Yes, among people who are racist. And even historically, France has always been
a welcoming place. France is the country of Human Rights, the country of opening up to
others, and the country of assimilation of various immigrant flows, since the Antiquity
until now and in recent times...The Italians, the “ritals" [slang] as we used to call them,
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the Spaniards with Franco, the Portuguese, the Polish in the mines of the North, and
their descendants are culturally French, so I don’t really see how someone can claim to
belong just because he has deep roots here."
Older, foreign born respondents generally reported having experience a general
decrease in interpersonal occurrences of overt racism in the last several decades. In the
realm of work, for example, no respondents reported having recently faced overt re-
marks or behavior indicative of strong dislike or tension on ground of ethnic difference.
In fact, many respondents were wary of the “trap" - as an East African respondent put it
- of interpreting personal rejection and failure as reflecting racial injustice, as they con-
sidered that systematically thinking in terms of racial groups led to “communitarianism"
(communautarisme) and the breaking down of the civic community - another hallmark
of official culture revolving around the “indivisible" French Republic.
Yet, the uncertainty of ethnoracial stigma in daily life was a recurrent theme, as the
respondent’s colleagues and extended family members never abruptly expressed such
views - often considered crass and ridiculed in highly educated, professional milieus.
As such, respondents often described themselves to be “protected" from racism in their
immediate environments, and narratives of confronting hostile individuals were rela-
tively rare in the qualitative data - while many interviewees reported isolated incidents,
only one reported a recent, strong confrontation in which he contemplated resorting to
the law to establish a wrongdoing on racial grounds. Instead, interviewees gave ambigu-
ous interactions and events the benefit of the doubt, especially among interviewees who
were in traditionally elites social milieus - e.g. legal and medical fields - where class
stigmatization was likely to be confounded with race. A general behavioral response
to stigma was thus to show professional competence (see Lamont and Fleming 2005
for an analogous result among successful African Americans), even though some re-
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spondents reported feeling as if they sometimes had to do more than their White, native
counterparts to gain and maintain respect.
Away from the polite and educated social milieux in which respondents evolved,
the hostility of certain natives manifested more clearly in electoral periods. The ever
high-scoring National Front served as an important reminder that France as a whole
might not be as inclusive as their immediate social environment. Yet, a typical Republi-
can rhetoric also informed the cultural response they put forward, in which the National
Front defended a misguided idea of France. In the words of a Moroccan-born elected
official:
A: “As far as I am concerned the Front National is not part of the Republic. I am
sorry, but no way [...]. France has benefited from waves of immigration that made it
what it is today, one of the most respected nations in the world. And foreign populations
have been necessary in order to feed this virtuous circle. It is not just about the Gallic
village [village gaulois] The FN defends this notion of a Gallic village, but it does not
exist. For me, fighting racism is also a pillar of France. And it is what honors it abroad
and why it can be seen as an example. It is the cradle of Human Rights, and of the
Enlightenment, let’s not forget it, French history is also about that.
Q: You think people who vote for the FN forget this aspect of history?
A: No, it’s not that, they simply don’t know it. They definitely don’t know it."
In that particular excerpt, the respondent used the themes of ignorance and social
progress to locate nativism and hostility towards immigrants - both strongly associated
with the National Front - outside the realm of Frenchness. This respondent’s reliance
on the themes of knowledge and culture reflect a broader response to perceived stigma -
one structured by a reliance on upper-middle class culture, to which I know turn.
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4.4.2 Framing racism: a kind of backwardness
When discussing how they perceived discrimination and stigmatization in France, some
interviewees began with personal anecdotes recounting experiences of overt racism in
public space - name calling, insults, and threats of violence. By and large, instances
of such explicit manifestations of hostility from the native population were rare, but
figured prominently in the symbolic boundaries respondents drew towards behaviors
they perceived as being primal and deeply uncultured.
An African born doctor, working at a major hospital in Eastern France, reminisced
of two occasions of abruptly xenophobic attitudes in public transportation, once as a
medical student in the subway and once as a junior high school student in a bus:
“One day a bus driver told me: “So you’ve come here to screw our wives, snow
white?”. I was 12, and I did not understand what he meant....I mean, I had learnt a
rather literary French back in [African capital]...and my friends later told me what it
actually meant."
“Once I took the subway, I sat down and an older person got up, spat on the
ground and said “you nigger!". Whatever..."
An elected official in a mid-sized city also recalled of similar interactions and com-
mented:
“This is a primal form of racism. Primal because it is really the reaction of an
animal in a jungle...I mean it just makes no sense. Someone who is just insulting, I
mean, I don’t see him as an animal but almost, because it is a violent behavior. I just
find it primeval..."
Both respondents oppose such direct expressions of hostility to a sense of civilization
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theywere endowed with at the time of those interactions.One’s contrast of his mastery of
a rich, formal French actually preventing him at first from understanding a grossly racist
remark is analogous to the other’s qualification of outwardly discriminatory behaviors
or remarks as primitive. Similar accounts of managing public interactions with hostile,
white natives depicted the ideal-type of the beauf - the French equivalent to a philistine.
In these accounts, a subtle stigmatization of typically “vulgar" ways of talking and act-
ing served to invalidate symbolic ethnic boundaries from natives without intellectually
engaging with it, at the time of the interaction or when recounting the story during the
interview. Nonchalant reactions (“whatever") typically served to mark such aggressive
verbal and bodily expressions as unfit to contest the respondents’ place in society. Strong
engagement of body and words in public interaction, valued as virility and honesty in
working-class culture, is typically stigmatized as impolite and uncivilized in middle and
upper-middle class culture (Pinto 1984).
The interviews material shows that stigmatization of manners and speech as infe-
rior is inseparable from a stigmatization of racism as an intellectual defect. A reliance on
the repertoire of cultural elitism (Bourdieu 1984, Lamont 1992) to characterize racism
as culturally backwards cut across the majority of interviews. In one instance when
a waiter assumed he was fasting and would thus just drink a coffee, a non-Muslim,
Tunisian-born music teacher was denied service at a restaurant. He explains that his
intellectual background empowered him and helped him get over his initial frustration:
Q: “What made you get over it so easily?
A: It is because I think I know where it is coming from. I know it is a preconceived
belief, I know the person who reacts like this doesn’t think at all, so why bother [...]. I
was raised this way. As I told you, my father is a very cultivated individual, he really is
a thinker."
112
Q: What is it that he taught you that was useful for you when facing racism?
A: To think. Yes. To think...When you face something, you have to try to understand
it, where it comes from and so on. It is much more satisfying than just reacting. Can
you imagine, about what I just told you at [name of the bar], here I come, I am not even
seated yet, I haven’t ordered anything and the waitress comes and tells me “sorry, no
coffee served on the terrace", I could have reacted pretty badly. And it would have been
somewhat legitimate...But no. No way."
In this interview excerpt, the dichotomy between reaction and reflection proposed by
the respondent parallels the boundary work of other interviewees contrasting a sense of
civilization with the “crass" behaviors and attitudes of discriminating natives discussed
above. He frames racist attitudes as being inherently irrational and lacking in intel-
lectual content - a type of knee-jerk reaction opposed to his own sense of intellectual
sophistication. He elaborates on his sense of superiority:
“No, I doesn’t bother me...That stuff does not affect me. There are times it arouses
pity, you know? I am someone who is really open-minded, and you know, there are times
[those reactions] are just appalling. It arouses pity because if I could talk to the person,
I could show her that I am much more open-minded, much more cultivated, you know.
And if she sought to know how I came here, what I am doing, and so on, I am sure she
would change her mind, you know?"
Interviewees’ boundary work coalesced around intellectualism and being intellec-
tually sophisticated. The theme of culture and being “cultivated" (an imperfect trans-
lation for “cultivé" in French), in particular, operated as a powerful discursive device.
Being cultivé refers primarily to having in-depth knowledge in diverse areas and being
intellectually accomplished - often beyond one’s professional sphere. This emphasis on
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gratuitous knowledge and “legitimate didacticism" (Bourdieu 1984: 24-5) is a key ele-
ment of social distinction in the French context, and a key component of the response to
stigma among the individuals I interviewed.
Corollary to the cultivated character of the respondents was a sheer “ignorance"
and “inculture" among the native stigmatizers - an intellectual defect identified as the
backbone of prejudice and discrimination. Respondents stigmatized inculte individu-
als’ ignorance of fields of knowledge as diverse as biology, history or the law - fields
that they, by contrast, claimed a strong command of in virtue of their work, or through
leisure reading. In doing so, respondents implicitly but powerfully claimed superior
ways of knowing - by punctuating their discourses with references to historical cases,
well-known experts, statistics in contrast to anti-immigrant discourses presented as folk
knowledge. This discursive sophistication, a hallmark of legitimate culture valuing ab-
stract and deductive knowledge compared to working-class modes of knowing valuing
experience (Bourdieu 1984, Pinto 1984), emphasizes a clear hierarchy in which “cul-
ture" and knowledge operate as corrosive agents against bigotry and racism. In other
words, “someone who is cultivated, who is open-minded towards the world, who reads
a lot, can’t be racist", as an Algerian born official put it.
Interviewees were more forgiving towards the regrettable attitudes of uneducated
and ignorant people compared to colleagues in professional positions for whom they
held higher intellectual standards. A French-born lawyer of Algerian ancestry said she
could understand how someone “who has less education, who is less cultivated, who is
not as smart" could be prejudiced - she, herself, could think this way “if she was a little
dumber than she actually is". When asked about what to think of prejudiced colleagues,
she elaborates:
“It is less acceptable insofar as lawyers are educated, smart people. I have a
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friend, his grandmother has never seen an Arab person in her whole life...She watches
T.V. and she hears about urban riots, by blacks and Maghribi people who burn cars. I
can understand why she would be racist and afraid. It is silly, because she is ignorant[...]
Even though I don’t approve, I can understand...But a lawyer who has been exposed to
a lot of people, who knows full well that an Arab is not any less worthy than a yellow or
a white person, indulging in racism, no I can’t accept it. Then I can actually judge that
person, and say “he is just a dummy" ".
By juxtaposing ignorance and “culture", interviewees also opposed a sense of narrow-
mindedness and lack of diversity - not knowing anyone different from oneself - to an
idea of cosmopolitanism and modernity they were part and parcel of. When prompted
to elaborate on what caused defiance vis-à -vis certain migrants groups, a public official
born in France of Algerian immigrants explained:
“Culture plays a role which is, in my view, paramount. That is, someone who is
isolated, without a culturally rich outlook on the world, without contact with others, and
I mean this for either whites, immigrants, or later generation immigrants. I think that
culture is important for bridging [differences]."
Culture - and being “cultured", i.e. cultivé in French - thus conveys a sense of refinement
- as in English - as well as knowledge, intellectual sophistication, and cosmopolitanism.
The final mark of this cultured stance on discrimination and stigmatization is a refusal
to engage in gut reaction, and to be “above race". Most interviewees adopted passive or
“zen" responses when experiencing or perceiving anti-immigrant stigma. Mixing both
an intellectual and emotional reflexivity, a senior executive born in France of Moroccan
parents, explains his own approach to dealing with occasional stigmatization:
“You can either react by thinking that all those people are dumb as a rock, or you
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can work at understanding this further...as a kind of deconstruction of the bias those
people have...I have chosen the second option."
4.4.3 Religious stigma and symbolic exclusion among Muslim re-
spondents
While such cultural elitism emerged as the overarching theme and a predominant way
to manage ethnoracial stigma, religious affiliation appeared to shape the experience of
Muslim interviewees. While this study did not set out to focus on religious stigma, the
Muslim-non Muslim divide vividly emerged during fieldwork. I therefore focused on
interviewing Muslim respondents in the last stages of fieldwork.
When comparing the reports on the perceived evolution of stigma and discrimina-
tion in everyday life, Muslim respondents typically told a very different story. While
they concurred with other respondents who said that blunt racism and purely ethnora-
cial stigma was fading away, they perceived anti-Muslim acts and discourses in everyday
life to have generally been increasing. Depending on their age and personal story, some
Muslim respondents identified various tipping points after which they felt things had
changed: for some, it was 9/11, while for others it was during Nicolas Sarkozy’s presi-
dency - whose campaign openly competed with that of the National Front, and perhaps
contributed to legitimize such discourse. For yet others, it was most clearly related to
the wave of Islamist terror attacks in the 2010s.
Importantly, no self-identified Muslim respondent reported that she perceived the
national cultural community to have grown more accepting of Islam and Muslims over
time, regardless of how these categories were defined across interviews. This was es-
pecially salient among religiously observant individuals, i.e. those who prayed, fasted
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or wore a religious sign. Such individuals - who made up the majority of the Muslim
respondents - generally reported growing difficulties in articulating their religious prac-
tices with daily life, particularly at work, where they perceived any visible manifestation
of religious practice as a potential liability. A corporate manager illustrated this point
by explaining why she chose to break her fast to have an important lunch with her boss
during Ramadan - something she would have never done a few years back. She did
it because she felt she had to show decency and dedication to the job (Montrer patte
blanche) to deal with generalized suspicion against Muslims:
“In that case, I did it. It really sucks...But I did it. Simply because I don’t want
others to think «Oh she is Muslim, she is doing Ramadan, she does not want to integrate
». It would mean than I bring my religion at work [...].I don’t want, by doing that, to say
to everyone at work that I am Muslim."
For Muslim interviewees, avoiding the image of someone “who does not want to
integrate" (qui ne veut pas s’intégrer) appeared as an important aspect of the presenta-
tion of the self - one to be reckoned during interactions with non-Muslims in the course
of daily life. The meaning of appearing as “integrated" varied across interviewees and
contexts : for some - especially women - it meant managing and responding to expec-
tations of gender traditionalism, and thus appearing as “modern" Muslims. Others like
the respondent above felt pressure at work, in public space or in social settings to be
“discrete" Muslims - i.e. not showing or expressing their religion, in accordance with
the public culture of secularism. For yet others, it meant strongly condemning and dis-
sociating themselves from self-identified Muslims who perpetrated terror attacks. Such
interpersonal interactions with non-Muslim colleagues, family members and friends did
not amount to stigma per se in the mind of respondents - although for some it did, of
course. Across situations and interviews however, it contributed to reify religion as a
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master status among individuals who, in line with the expectations of the French cul-
tural context, saw it as a private matter. This contradiction, which resulted in being seen
first and foremost as a Muslim, was particularly frustrating for respondents who were
were born in France. One female respondent, a senior executive at a major transportation
company, explained:
“For a while I have felt that secularism [la¨é] has been something aggressive, and
still is today. I am all for secularism the way it was defined in the 1905 law because it
allows for the cohabitation of different religions. But I am not for a fundamentalist and
dogmatique secularism [la¨intégriste, dogmatique].
Q: It is something you have personally felt? This weight?
Yes, sometimes I have this impression. Staying positive and benevolent in that
context is hard. For a while I have had the feeling that I am forced to just be a Muslim.
But I am not just Muslim. I am French, I am a women, I am a worker, I am a mother.
We just see my Arabness [on me renvoie à mon arabité], which is a part of me as well,
as well as my religion. And I am aware that for some, I am not fully French. For me, I
am, and I am at peace with that. I know some people in my situation are not at peace
with that. But I am. I think in French, I dream in French. I was schooled in France. And
I take part in the national French effort."
Muslim respondents generally reported that they perceived the brunt of anti-
Muslim discourses as occurring in the realm of politics and the mass media rather than
at the interpersonal level. Criticizing the way many politicians and pundits portrayed
Islam and Muslims was thus a theme that unambiguously cut across all interviews.
When asked an open question about how the atmosphere in France vis-à -vis Islam had
changed, a French born Muslim of Moroccan parents and medical doctor spontaneously
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referred to a change in terms of public discourse:
“It’s very subjective...But my impression, like that of many other Muslims, is that
on television, in the media and especially in politics, we are constantly criticized as
Muslims specifically. And this has been like this for a while [...]. I would say this has
been like this since 2004 and the law on the veil in public schools. And I feel that they
are always trying to cast us in a same mold.
Q: Who is “they", here?
It is mainly right wing politicians, but also left wing ones now, relayed by certain
journals and pundits [...]. It’s not that we are not integrated, it’s that certain such
persons do not want to integrate us.
Q: : And this has been since 2004?
Yes. I feel like I was insulted then. And that I have often been insulted since."
Respondents fustigated both the quality - focusing on select cases reflecting badly
on Muslims - and the quantity of political and news coverage on the topic. They had
come to expect the same reporting or articles on halal slaughtering, illegal mosque build-
ing and other similar topic as they generally coincided with the celebrations of the Mus-
lim calendar. About a third of respondents reported that they simply stopped watching
television in the last few years as a result of this excessive coverage. Several, in particu-
lar, regretted the fact that many public conversations on Islam occurred without the voice
of Muslims themselves - instead inviting pundits or theological scholars respondents did
not see as legitimate. This led to the impression of a constant conversation “about us
but without us", as an interviewee put it. Yet, many were pleasantly surprised at recent
electoral results, including the 2012 and, for interviews to took place after it, the 2017
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presidential elections. They realized, in the process, that media and political framings
of Islam were not necessarily shared in the public at large, as a female respondent puts
it about the election of moderate left president Hollande in 2012:
“I was very angry some time ago, and I was telling myself «I am going to leave
France». That was four or five years ago. I had discussed this with one of my old bosses.
And finally I decided against it. I thought I would stay, I would fight.
Q: When was this exactly?
This was after the terror attacks by Mohammed Merah. The climate was really,
really tough. I really thought about it [leaving]. But I did not do it. What reconciled
me, is that there had been the 2012 elections afterwards, and I told myself «the media is
trying to have us believe that the whole of France is against Muslims, but in fact it’s not
the case »."
In the excerpt above, the interviewee reported realizing during elections that the
situation was not as bad as she had thought. Importantly, this situation of Muslim re-
spondents represents a inversion to that of non-Muslim upper-middle class immigrants,
for whom daily life was rather incident free, and who only occasionally realized that hos-
tility was “out there" during electoral periods when the anti-immigrant National Front
scored high even if it did not win. More generally, it is abundantly clear from the in-
terview material that the general “climate" respondents perceived as hostile to Muslims
took a big toll on their ability to project their future in France. Past and present plans
to leave, such as that expressed by the respondent above, were explicitly mentioned by
three other interviewees. Some planned to go back to the lands of their parents (e.g.
Morocco or Algeria) to be able to practice and live their faiths as they pleased, without
the shackles they felt in France. Others thought of emigrating and often compared the
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negative French context to England or the United States, places they perceived as more
welcoming.
4.4.4 “This is not what Islam is about": boundary work around
religious authenticity
A crucial difference between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents emerged at the level
of boundary work respondents employed to position themselves within the national
community and claim membership. Contrary to non-Muslim respondents, their bound-
ary work did not draw distinctions vis-à -vis hostile or “Islamophobic" natives, but rather
vis-à -vis other self-identified Muslims who tarnished Islam, and against whom they had
to compete for the legitimate definition of what their religion was and was not. Muslim
respondents generally did not challenge anti-Muslim attitudes; in fact, several reported
they understood why public opinion was hostile. Rather, they positioned themselves to
be better representatives of Islam than those who, in their opinion, gave it a bad name.
Respondents’ presentation of their faith and practices followed three major themes
organized around implicit dichotomies: they presented Islam as being personal (as op-
posed to communitarian), complex and nuanced (as opposed to dogmatic) and univer-
salist (as opposed to particularist). As such, they typically framed their practices and
views as that of “liberal Muslims". In doing so, they revealed the long shadow of cultural
tropes and ongoing debates regarding the nature of Islam, its purported incompatibility
with secularism and Western liberal democratic norms, its inherent social conservatism
and the nature of its links with religiously motivated acts of terrorism - a set of ques-
tion framing Islam as a “cultural problem" respondents had to take a stand on when
discussing their own views.
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When discussing their approach to Islam, respondents were often very individual-
istic - and consistently referred to “their" vision of their religion, both acknowledging
its internal diversity and the legitimacy of their personal interpretations. This meant, for
many, the separation of strict religious rituals from faith and personal religious values as
criteria to belong within the Muslim community. One male respondent explained why
his lack of rigorous practice did not make him any less Muslim:
“Just because I don’t do all those things does not mean I am not Muslim. This
is my view, and it might be wrong, but when I talk to a Muslim at a mosque, the pious
kind who tells me I am going to go to hell, I just feel like telling them to shut up. This
is ridiculous, and I am amazed to see people live by three lines in a book telling them
how to lead their lives, what they have to do from morning to evening. The Coran is a
manual for society [...], but I hate what the 21st century is doing with it. I would like to
go back to the time of the Ottoman empire. That was the real Islam, it did not prevent
you from living your life here on Earth, to be close to God.
Q: Can you explain a bit more what “amazes you", as you said?
It amazes me to see some people acting like dummies, especially judging others
if they do not do it the way they want it [...]. It amazes me to see them judging others,
killing others in the name of God. Commit such crimes and murders...While what they
say is so not true! I am talking about radical Islam today. As we often talk about and
see it in France today. It amazes me that they tarnish the image of Islam because this is
not what Islam is about. If everyone were like me, to be the way you want to be, to just
respect others. One can be an atheist and be a good person. It is about the beauty of the
heart, the beauty of the soul that religion is about.
Q: Is this what being Muslim is about for you?
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Yes, exactly, this is my personal definition of it. As long as I don’t hurt people
around me. I try to do good when I can, not everyday but whenever I can. And for me,
this is enough, and I don’t need an asshole to come tell me I am going to burn in hell.
In this interview excerpt, the respondent focuses on morality and “doing good" as
a trait making him a good Muslim, and naturally established a continuum between strict
practice, community control, religious fundamentalism, and religious violence. This
continuum was not present in all interviews, as many respondents were eager to simply
and strongly state that Islam had nothing to do with terrorism. More generally, many
made a case that Islam, at its core, was not about blindly following scriptures but about
diffuse, moral values - such as generosity for the poor, tolerance, empathy, respect for
the elderly, faithfulness, integrity and honesty. This focus on values empirically reflects
the process of religious incorporation in the French context, which implies a process
of individualization and privatization away from collective and organized forms of re-
ligious expression. At the level of meaning-making, it allowed respondents to abstract
Islam away from specific rituals to focus on what it shared with other religions, such as
Christianity or Buddhism, and atheists with moral decency. As such, a focus on reli-
gious value was a way to establish equality and frame Islam as an ordinary religion with
a universal reach. One of my interviewees felt uneasy identifying what differentiated
“good" and “bad" Muslims. She was, however, keen to describe the essence of “her"
conception of Islam and said:
“What is most important in my conception of Islam, and in any case, what I would
like for us all [Muslims] to share as much as possible, are shared values [...]. There
are so many universal values in Islam, I would like for this to be most important to
people. The rest are just personal arrangements [cuisine interne]. The rest, who gives
a damn, really? If we could get together around values of generosity, sharing, respect,
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humanism. And curiosity, which I think is also an Islamic value, to want to be educated
rather than to be passive and to just get swallowed in. I mean, to determine the type of
life you want to lead, which is a common aspect in a lot of religions and philosophies.
This, I would like us to have more emphasis on. Conversely, what I sometimes regret
is this more obscurantist approach, a bit less educated and learned, which uses this
[religion] and could use something else. A lot of these people are just thugs, for me [...].
Typically, terrorists, I mean little pricks, really, sorry for me they are just little thugs.
They could have done anything, they could have gone into the mob or criminal networks.
It’s just the same thing, except it has this Islamic “hat" on it. It is so unfortunate for
others that it is this hat in particular.
While respondents did not rely on the repertoire of cultural elitism and knowledge
to disqualify and deflect anti-Muslim attitudes, they often used it to criticize radical in-
terpretations of Islam. In this respect, Muslim respondents drew on similar tools and
themes as non-Muslim ones, but they directed it at other, undesirable Muslims rather
than native, non-Muslim French harboring hostility towards Islam. The themes of cul-
ture and knowledge were typically framed in a narrative of religious self-actualization
in which the respondents came to “their" vision of Islam through autonomous reading
and questioning - thus generally presenting their religious trajectory as a personal quest.
As for the respondent above, the figure of the radical Muslim - uneducated and uncrit-
ical in her approach to scriptures and prescriptions - served as a backdrop to depict the
respondent’s more enlightened approach as authentic and trustworthy. The figure of the
undesirable, radical Muslim was not consistent across interviews. For some, it was that
of religiously motivated terrorists. Others stigmatized gender traditionalism and homo-
phobia. Older respondents were more broadly critical of the second generation’s intense
but ill-informed new forms of religious practices, which they did not see as authentic
and part of their traditions.
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4.5 Discussion & conclusions
To sum up, this paper documents the subjective experience of belonging and stigmatiza-
tion among upwardly mobile immigrants in France. It shows that non-Muslim respon-
dents faced moderate levels of stigma and deal with it with the toolkit of upper-middle
class culture and its emphasis on cultural elitism to frame racism as a backwards phe-
nomenon. By contrast, it shows that Muslim respondents face higher levels of stigma
- casting them as outsiders despite high level of socioeconomic attainment - and lack
a readily available cultural toolkit to make sense of their belonging in French society.
As such, this study suggests that upward mobility might be a necessary but insufficient
cause for symbolic belonging - being included as “one of us" by the natives (Schachter
2016). It thus underscores the cultural aspects of assimilation, i.e. the analytic im-
portance of publicly available scripts, narratives and symbols for meaning-making and
claiming one’s place in society when such place is challenged. It suggests that a cultural
perspective emphasizing the relevance of meaning, symbolic and scripts in the assimila-
tion process can complement dominant and structurally minded approaches focusing on
the relationship between ethnoracial differences and life chances (Alba and Nee 2003,
Heath et al. 2008, Alba and Foner 2015).
4.5.1 How cultural repertoires enable and disable claims to belong-
ing among structurally integrated immigrants
On one hand, I find that non-Muslim respondents of various ethnic origins rely on upper-
middle class culture and its emphasis on knowledge and cultural refinement (Bourdieu
1984) to cast racism as ignorant, crass and hence invalid. This echoes findings from La-
mont’s (1992) landmark comparative study of the American and French upper-middle
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class. She found that Americans were more likely to use money and morality vis-à -vis
others they felt superior to, whilst their French counterpart used snobbism and high cul-
ture to a much greater extent - a finding explained by a long tradition of court society and
intellectualism in the Enlightenment period that contributed to legitimize cultural elitism
as a toolkit for social distinction among the elites (Lamont 1992, chapter 5). As such,
the boundary-making strategies of non-Muslims respondents documented in this study
represents a continuity with past work, and suggests that the national cultural repertoire
of cultural elitism in France helps the symbolic inclusion of immigrant newcomers.
Conversely, the predicament faced by Muslim respondents underscores the ab-
sence of a religious repertoire for belonging among French elites. In France, a tradition
of anti-clericalism inherited from the Revolution and the influence of socialism has long
discredited religion among the upper-middle class. Rather, the Enlightenment tradition
motivating French Republicanism has produced a rationalist and individualistic (rather
than ethnic or religious) conception of the political community - and one in which reli-
gious minorities have been seen as potential threats to social cohesion (Brubaker 1992:
104-110, Kastoryano 2002: 49-51). The French tradition of citizenship therefore does
not provide readily available cultural repertoires to reconcile religious and national be-
longing, and tends to marginalize morality as a ground for boundary making - a point
made vivid by Lamont’s (1992) comparison with the United States.
This study highlights how cultural repertoires provide templates to classify and
deal with stigmatization in everyday life among upwardly mobile immigrants. It adds to
recent effort aimed at uncovering the role of cultural repertoires in shaping perceptions
of, and responses to stigma (Lamont et al. 2016). Conversely, it suggests that, for
upwardly mobile Muslim respondents, traditional markers of assimilation and social
success do not necessarily translate into a strong sense of belonging. Without easily
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available repertoires for meaning-making - such as national myths and narratives derived
from widely shared, legitimate, public political culture - Muslim respondents showed far
less ease in deflecting religious stigma and presenting themselves as valuable members
of the national community.
4.5.2 The resilience of religious stigmatization in spite of social mo-
bility
This study complements recent work identifying unique barriers to assimilation among
Muslim minorities above and beyond race (Adida et al. 2016, Heath and Martin 2012,
Bleich 2009, Alba and Foner 2015 chapter 6). In this study, I show that such symbolic
barrier remains for those who experience high structural attainment in French society.
Why is this the case?
On one hand, discrimination and stigmatization on ground of race and ethnic dif-
ference have lost legitimacy - they are both illegal and informally sanctioned through
reverse stigmatization - e.g. most people strongly seek to avoid appearing as racist.
The same, however cannot be said about the widespread suspicion directed at Islam
in contemporary Europe, which often appears under the guise of progressivism. Con-
temporary controversies about the inclusion of Islam, Islamic practices and the limits
of multiculturalism often bring to the fore progressive position on women’s rights, gay
rights, and even animal right’s - in the case of halal slaughter - that construe Islam as a
vector of cultural backwardness (Scott 2007, Bowen 2007). Such a civilizationist view,
now widespread in new populist rhetoric and the European public at large (Brubaker
2017), makes it effectively much harder for Muslim individuals to dismiss anti-Muslim
attitudes. Rather, it puts the onus on Muslim individuals, themselves, to show that they
are not backwards by differentiating themselves from undesirable Muslims.
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More generally, the resilience of a religious stigma in spite of mobility among
Muslim respondents reflects the contested and politicized nature of Islam in a period
of “unsettled times" (Swidler 1986) brought about by heightened security concerns and
rising cultural diversity. In such a period, competing definitions and views on Islam
are proliferating in public space, and contributing to reifying religion as the dominant
way to handle and discuss such cultural diversity (Brubaker 2013). Because of their
high degree of politicization, Muslim practices are all but “optional" (Waters 1990);
rather, they carry social costs which manifest themselves in everyday life and must be
reckoned with - as in the case of the respondent above carefully weighting if she should
break her fast to attend lunch with her boss. While many respondents in this study
voiced their desire to be considered like any other ordinary French citizen (Beaman
2015), their experience suggests that their Muslim identity remains particularly salient
in daily interactions with non-Muslim others. In other words, religious stigma in the
lives of upwardly mobile Muslim immigrants does not only consist in a diffuse hostility
toward Islam, but also in religious affiliation superseding other social identities due to
the politicization of religion.
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4.6 Appendix A: Core questions of the interview guide
1 - Where were you born? How and when did you arrive in France?
2 - Now tell me a little bit about your background, what you studied at school as
well as your professional history.
3 - As of today, do you feel French? Why?
4 - What is your definition of racism? What are examples?
5 - Have you ever felt that you had been discriminated because of your, name,
skin color, religion, etc? — In what circumstances? — Other anecdotes. —At what
frequency?
6 - Beyond these anecdotes, what is your general experience with discrimination?
—in public spaces? —At work? —Elsewhere?
7 - People react really differently when facing adverse circumstances like this.
What was your reaction?
8 - What is you relationship with your country of origins? —As of today, do you
have any sentiment of belonging to a community other than France?
9 - According to you, how has racism changed in the course of the last 3 decades?
How will it change in the future?
10 - How do you feel toward the political discourse of the National Front? —Why
would some people vote for the National Front?
11 - How any of your experience of racism affected your feeling of belonging to
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France? Why?
12 - How do you treat the question of racism with your children (how would you
treat it if you do not have children yet?) - if so, how did you handle the issue?
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4.7 Appendix B: Demographic characteristics of respondents
Table 4.1: Demographic characteristics of interviewees
Age Occupation Gender Immigrant origin
52 Doctor M West African
54 Lawyer M Maghreb
52 Professor M West African
41 Corporate executive F Maghreb
26 Ph.D student in social science M Maghreb
41 Regional state official F East African
27 Corporate executive F Maghreb
31 Central government official F Maghreb
44 Corporate executive M Maghreb
25 Music teacher M Maghreb
57 Veterinary physician M East Africa
36 Corporate executive F Maghreb
28 Central state official F Maghreb
25 Urban planner M Maghreb
30 Lawyer F Maghreb
50 School principal M Maghreb
29 Community organizer M West Africa
28 Tech entrepreneur F Maghreb
28 Ph.D student in social science F Maghreb
34 Schoolteacher F West African
42 Engineer M Maghreb
30 Local state official M Maghreb
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32 Accountant F Maghreb
33 Ph.D student in physics & high school teacher M West African
45 Central state official F Maghreb
58 Doctor F Maghreb
26 Lawyer F Maghreb
43 Schoolteacher F Maghreb
22 Special education teacher F Maghreb
39 Journalist M Maghreb
24 Business student M Maghreb
29 Schoolteacher M Maghreb
30 Doctor M East Africa
52 Professor M Maghreb
33 Research scientist M West Africa
45 Corporate executive M Maghreb
30 Corporate executive M Maghreb
28 Engineer M Maghreb
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